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GO WORLD
Summer 2004 NO.101

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KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

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Original Japanese wooden block prints (*ukiyo-e*) on go themes by great Japanese artist are available for sale by Mita Arts Gallery. All prints are accompanied with a Letter of Authenticity. Mita Arts is a specialist in Japanese prints and is now celebrating its 40th anniversary. The three prints below are currently being offered for sale.

Title: Prince Mitsuuji at a Spa
Artist: Kunisada (Toyokuni III)
Date: 1861; **Format:** Oban Triptych
Condition: Good Impression and color
Price: \$900

This design is titled Interior View of Amusements of the Hikaru Family at a Spa. Hikaru was Prince Genji's personal name. (For the story of Prince Genji, see <http://www.kiseido.com/printss/genji.html> and *Go World* #67) Genji is holding a bamboo flute and waiting for the attendant with the samisen to tune her instrument.



Title: Apparition of the Spider Princess
Artist: Yoshitoshi Tsukioka
Date: 1886; **Format:** Oban Diptych
Condition: Good; **Price:** \$800

This print is based on the legend of the Ground Spider (See <http://www.kiseido.com/printss/raiko.html> and *Go World* #62 for the story). Sakata no Kintoki, one of Raiko's retainers, has been dozing with his head on the go board. He suspiciously opens his eyes as a seductive woman — actually an apparition created by the Ground Spider — glides by on her errand of mischief.

Title: Horsemen Exhibiting Their Skills
Artist: Kuniteru
Date: 1872; **Format:** Oban Triptych
Condition: Good Impression and color
Price: \$900

A depiction of various feats of horsemanship. The rider in the left panel is demonstrating his skill by causing his horse to mount a go board.



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The cover: Gods Playing Go. A chuban print by Kyosai. This print, using the Ranka theme, depicts the Goddess of Mercy watching a game between the God of Thunder (left) and the God of Wind, two of her 30 subjects, in the guise of demons.

Go World is published by Kiseido Publishing Company, CPO Box 1140, Tokyo, Japan.
Visit Kiseido's web site at: <http://www.kiseido.com/> Editor: Richard Bozulich

Order from:
Kiseido, CPO Box 1140, Tokyo Japan
FAX: +81-467-58-5814;
e-mail: kiseido@yk.or.jp
Price: US\$32 per year (four issues);
Airmail price: US\$44 per year (four issues),
sent from Japan; back issues: US\$9 per issue

European subscribers, order from:
Schaak en Gowinkel het Paard
Haarlemmerdijk 147
1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland
Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: +31-20-627-0885
Price: Euro 7,25 per issue

Play go on the Internet on the Kiseido Go Server: <http://kgs.kiseido.com/>

A complete index of *Go World* is available at: <http://www.yk.rim.or.jp/~kiseido/GWINDEX/gwi.html>

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Go World News

February~May 2004

by John Power

International

Yi Ch'ang-ho wins 8th LG Cup

The final of the 8th LG Cup featured an unfamiliar face: Mok Chin-seok 7-dan. Mok had established himself as one of the top players in Korea a few years ago only to be eclipsed subsequently by the new wave of teenaged stars. His last international success was second place in the TV Asia Cup in 2001.

Mok made a good start in the title match, but his opponent, Yi Ch'ang-ho, then turned on the pressure and swept the next three games. Yi himself has been overshadowed by the younger players recently, but he showed once again that he is in a class of his own. He may have suffered some setbacks on the domestic tournament scene, but here he is now with his 19th world title.

This was Yi's fourth win in the LG Cup; he took home a prize of 250 million won. Mok had to be satisfied with 80 million won and a promotion to 8-dan.

Note that all the semifinalists were Korean.

Semifinals (3 February)

Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (W) beat Weon Seong-chin 5-dan by resig.; Mok Chin-seok (B) b. Cho Han-seung by 2½.

Final (Kwangju & Seoul)

Game 1 (9 March). Mok (B) by 3½.

Game 2 (11 March). Yi (B) by resig.

Game 3 (29 March). Yi (W) by resig.

Game 4 (1 April). Yi (B) by resig.

Korea wins 5th Nong Shim Cup

The final round in this international team tournament was held in Shanghai in February. For once, Korea, which had fielded a relatively inexperienced team, had faltered, so Japan seemed to have its best chance yet of taking the cup, especially after its second-last player eliminated China. However, the final player on the Korean team, Yi Ch'ang-ho, proved to be an insuperable obstacle, as he has so often in the past. He disposed of the last two Japanese players and maintained Korea's monopoly of this tournament. (The other four players were chosen by competition, but Yi was seeded.)

Ironically, Japan won more games than Korea — in a sense, it helped Korea to win by disposing of Chinese players (scores — Japan: 6–5; Korea: 5–4; China: 3–5).

First prize is 150 million won (about \$140,000).

The Shanghai round

Game 11 (11 Feb.). Gu Li 7-dan (China) (B) beat Weon Seong-chin 5-dan (Korea) by 2½.

Game 12 (12 Feb.). Kato Masao 9-dan (Japan) (W) beat Gu by resig.

Game 13 (13 Feb.). Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) beat Kato by resig.

Game 14 (14 Feb.). Yi (B) beat Rin Kaiho 9-dan (Japan) by resig.

Korea has now won this team tournament and its predecessor, the Jinro Cup, ten times in a row. Its grip on international go remains as firm as ever.

China wins 3rd CSK Cup

In contrast to the Nong Shim Cup, victory in the CSK Cup has been shared equally among the top three go powers. After Korea won the inaugural tournament and Japan the second, China has triumphed this year. Perhaps it will be Chinese Taipei's turn next year.

The Chinese were quite disappointed with their third-place finish last year and this year their players approached the team tournament with real determination. This paid off when they scored a decisive victory over their main rival, Korea, dropping only one game. China also defeated Japan and Chinese Taipei, so they won the tournament outright, without the tally of games won coming into play, but here also they topped Korea.

Like last year, the tournament was held at the Manza Beach Hotel in Onna Village in Okinawa. The locomotives of the Chinese team were the 21-year-old Kong Jie and the 20-year-old Wang Xi, who both won all their games. The latter in particular was very happy with his success, as it redeemed his failure last year, when he lost all three games.

In one year Japan tumbled from first to last place. In particular, it was let down by the two players who had just finished fighting the Kisei title match a few days earlier: neither Hane nor Yamashita won a game. Perhaps they were both exhausted by their two-month struggle.

Korea again played consistently, taking second place again. Cho Hun-hyeon was missing from the team for the first time, but the two emerging superstars Song T'ae-kon and Ch'oe Ch'eol-han were there to take up the slack. As it turned out, however, Yi Ch'ang-ho was the only Korean player to win all his games.

First prize is ¥20,000,000 (about \$185,000), 2nd ¥10,000,000, 3rd ¥6,000,000, and 4th ¥4,000,000.

This tournament has been identified with Okinawa so far, but the sponsors announced that it will be held in Seoul next year.

Full results

Round 1 (21 March)

Japan vs. China: 2-3

Yoda Norimoto (W) beat Wang Lei by resig.
Hane Naoki (B) lost to Wang Xi by 1½.
Yamashita Keigo (W) lost to Yu Bin by resig.
Mimura Tomoyasu (B) lost to Kong Jie by resig.
Yuki Satoshi (W) beat Ding Wei by resig.

Korea vs. Chinese Taipei: 5-0

Yi Ch'ang-ho (W) beat Cho U by resig.
Yu Ch'ang-hyeok (B) beat O Rissei by ½.
Yi Se-tol (W) beat O Meien by resig.
Ch'oe Ch'eol-han (B) beat Rin Kaiho by resig.
Song T'ae-kon (W) beat Zhou Junxun by 5½.

Round 2 (22 March)

Japan vs. Korea: 1-4

Yoda (W) beat Yu by 3½.
Yamashita (B) lost to Ch'oe by resig.
Hane (W) lost to Yi Se-tol by resig.
Mimura (B) lost to Song by resig.
Yuki (W) lost to Yi Ch'ang-ho by resig.

China vs. Chinese Taipei: 4-1

Kong (W) beat Cho by resig.
Wang Xi (B) beat Zhou by resig.
Ding (W) beat Rin by 3½.
Wang Lei (B) beat O Meien by 7½.
Yu Bin (W) lost to O Rissei by 15½.

Round 3 (23 March)

Japan vs. Chinese Taipei: 2-3

Yamashita (B) lost to O Rissei by 2½.
Yuki (W) beat O Meien by ½.
Mimura (B) beat Cho U by resig.
Hane (W) lost to Rin by 3½.
Yoda (B) lost to Zhou by resig.

China vs. Korea: 4-1

Kong (B) beat Ch'oe by resig.
Ding (W) beat Yi Se-tol by resig.
Yu (B) beat Song by resig.
Wang Wei (W) lost to Yi Ch'ang-ho by resig.
Wang Xi (B) beat Yu by 1½.

Summary	matches won	games won
1st: China	3	11
2nd: Korea	2	10
3rd: Ch. Taipei	1	4
4th: Japan	0	5

Korea does well in 17th Fujitsu Cup

'Business as usual' is one way it could be put: Korea has again dominated the Fujitsu Cup, with five quarterfinalists. Once again, China has done badly, failing to qualify for the best eight for the second year in a row. Having a good tournament was Taiwan's top player, Zhou Junxun, who beat China's number one, Gu Li, and the reigning titleholder, Yi Se-tol, who seems to be passing through a lean spell on the international scene. The numbers are made up by the Japanese Meijin and Honinbo.

Japanese fans will be pinning their hopes on Yoda. Earlier in his career, Yoda took a big lead over Yi Ch'ang-ho, but in recent years the latter has redressed the balance.

Incidentally, Korea's Cho Hun-hyeon is the only player who has appeared in all 17 Fujitsu Cups.

Round 1 (10 April, Nihon Ki-in)

O Meien 9-dan (Japan) (B) b. Senfen Wang, amateur 6-dan (South America), by 17½; Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 7-dan (Korea) (B) b. Svetlana Shikshina 1-dan (Europe) by resig.; Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Qiu Jun 6-dan (China) by resig.; Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Ch. Taipei) (W) b. Gu Li 7-dan (China) by resig.; Cho Han-seung 7-dan (Korea) (B) b. Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) by resig.; Wang Lei 8-dan (China) (W) b. Huiren Yang 1-dan (North America) by 12½; Kong Jie 7-dan (China) (B) b. Takao Shinji 8-dan (Japan) by resig.; Pak Yeong-hun 5-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yuki Satoshi 9-dan (Japan) by 1½.

Round 2 (12 April, Nihon Ki-in)

Zhou (Ch. Taipei) (W) b. Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) by resig.; Song T'ae-kon 6-dan (Korea) (W) b. Kong (China) by resig.; Ch'oe (Korea) (W) b. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. O Meien (Japan) by 4½; Pak (Korea) (B) b. Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan) by 5½; Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan) (W) b. Cho Hun-hyeon (Korea) by 4½; Cho U 9-dan (Japan) (B) b. Cho Han-seung (Korea) by resig.; Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Wang (China) by 3½.

Semifinal pairings (5 June, Nihon Ki-in)

Yoda vs. Yi Ch'ang-ho; Zhou Junxun vs. Song T'ae-kon; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok vs. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han; Cho U vs. Pak Yeong-hun.

China and Korea share honours in 5th Ing Cup

With its first prize of \$400,000, the Ing Cup is the richest of the international tournament. It is staged in the year of the Olympics, and the opening three rounds were held in Shanghai from 20 to 24 April. The host country made up for its dismal showing in the Fujitsu Cup by sharing the semifinal places evenly with Korea. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the tournament is that this time neither of the Korean semifinalists is named Yi. Se-tol was eliminated in the first round and Ch'ang-ho lost to his recent nemesis, Ch'oe Ch'eol-han, in the quarterfinals (unlike most international tournaments, the organizers seem to try to avoid pairing players from the same country only in the first two rounds).

We don't have the pairings or the dates for the best-of-three semifinals yet, but we can predict that the winner will be making his debut as a world champion.

Some notes on the tournament system: Participants are invited by the sponsors, not chosen by their professional associations. Rules are the Ing Rules devised by the late Ing Ch'ang-ki, the tournament founder. Komi is eight points, with white winning a jigo. The time allowance is three and a half hours, but players can 'buy' extra time up to 90 minutes at the rate of two points of komi per 30 minutes. Results below are given Japanese style (to get the official Ing results, double the points margin).

Round 1 (20 April, Shanghai)

Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Liu Jing 6-dan (China) by resig.; Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 7-dan (Korea) (B) b. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan) (W) b. Gu Li 7-dan (China) by ½; Song T'ae-kon 6-dan (Korea) (W) b. Cho U 9-dan (Chinese Taipei) by 1½; Kong Jie 7-dan (China) (B) b. Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) by 1½; Peng Quan 5-dan (China) (B) b. O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) by 1½; Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Ch. Taipei) (B) b. Alexandr Dinerchtein 1-dan (Russia) by 4½; Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) (W) b. Jimmy Cha (USA) by 1½.

Round 2 (22 April, Shanghai)

Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yamashita (Japan) by 1½; Chang Hao 9-dan (China) (B) b. Yu (Korea) by resig.; Ch'oe (Korea) (B) b. Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China) by 1½; Song (Korea) (W) b. Yu Bin 9-dan (China) by resig.; Kong (China) (B) b. Rin Kaiho

9-dan (Japan) by resig.; Zhou (China) (W) b. Otake Hideo 9-dan (Japan) by 4½; Peng (China) (B) b. Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan) by resig.; O Meien 9-dan (Japan) (B) b. Zhou (Chinese Taipei) by ½.

Quarterfinals (24 April, Shanghai)

Chang (China) (W) b. Kong (China) by resig.; Peng (China) (B) b. Zhou (China) by resig.; Ch'oe (Korea) (B) b. Yi (Korea) by 2½; Song (Korea) (W) b. O Meien (Japan) by resig.



Yu Bin

Yu Bin wins 16th TV Asia

Yu Bin has scored his second victory in the TV Asia Cup. The veteran Chinese player showed considerable wiliness in overcoming unfavourable positions in his games against Cho Chikun and Song T'ae-kon. In the final against Song, Yu managed to kill a large group when Song missed the best move for making eye shape.

Yu also won the 9th TV Asia Cup in 1997 and the 4th LG Cup in 2000. With three titles, he is now the most successful Chinese player in international tournaments, having passed Ma Xiaochun.

The 17-year-old Song had to be content with his second second place, following last year's Fujitsu Cup.

Round One

(11 May) Song T'ae-kon 7-dan (Korea) (W) beat Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (Japan) by 6½; Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) (W) beat Gu Li 7-dan (China) by 2½. (12 May) Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (W) beat Pak Pyeong-kyu 4-dan (Korea) by resig.

Semifinals

(12 May) Song (W) beat Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) by resig. (13 May) Yu Bin (W) beat Cho Chikun by resig.

Final (14 May)

Yu Bin (B) beat Song by 12½.

Korea dominates 9th LG Cup

Korean players have dominated the opening

rounds of the 9th LG Cup, taking five of the quarterfinal places. Unlike the other tournaments reported on in this issue, both the Yis have survived, but they are paired against each other in the next round.

China took two quarterfinal places, the same as in the 8th Cup, and Japan one, which is an improvement on the previous year. There are so many strong young Korean players now that it's very difficult for even the top players from the other countries to do well in the international tournaments. When a top Japanese or Chinese player beats one of Korea's teenaged stars, one feels that he has scored a success, even though he is the senior player in career. This applies, for example, in this tournament, to Yamashita's win over Song T'ae-kon (age 17) in the first round and Kong Jie's over Ch'oe Ch'eol-han (age 19) in the second. With two second places in world titles, Song is clearly already one of the world's top players, while Ch'oe's recent victories over Yi Ch'ang-ho in domestic titles (see the Korean news section) are just as awesome.

Korea's five places is actually one fewer than last year. Will the three non-Koreans be able to dent Korea's near monopoly (six out of eight) in this title?

Round One (18 May, Seoul)

Yamashita Keigo 9-dan (Japan) (B) b. Song T'ae-kon 7-dan (Korea) by resig.; O Rissei (Japan) (B) b. Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) by 2½; Cho U 9-dan (Japan) (W) b. Ch'oe 3-dan by resig.; Kim Man-su 5-dan (Korea) (B) b. Hane Naoki 9-dan (Japan) by 1½; Pak Seung-hyeon 4-dan (Korea) (B) b. O Meien 9-dan (Japan) on time; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Zhou Heyang 9-dan (China) by resig.; Kong Jie 7-dan (China) (W) b. Zhou Junxun 9-dan (Chinese Taipei) by resig.; Jiang Mingjiu 7-dan (USA) (B) b. Franz-Josef Dickhut, amateur 6-dan (Europe), by resig.

Round Two (20 May, Seoul)

Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. O Rissei (Japan) by resig.; Yu (Korea) (B) b. Gu Li 7-dan (China) by 2½; Cho U (Japan) (B) b. Mok Chin-seok 8-dan (Korea) by resig.; Kong (China) (W) b. Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 8-dan (Korea) by resig.; Cho Han-seung 7-dan (Korea) (W) b. Yamashita (Japan) by 7½; Weon Seong-chin 5-dan (Korea) (B) b. Kim (Korea) by 2½; Yi Se-tol 9-dan (Korea) (B) b. Jiang (USA) by resig.; Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (W) beat Pak (Korea) by resig.

Quarterfinal pairings (28 October, Seoul)

Yi vs. Yi; Yu Ch'ang-hyeok vs. Cho U; Cho Han-seung vs. Kong; Weon vs. Yu Bin.

China's first victory in Japan-China Kiri-yama Cup

The 5th Agon Kiri-yama Cup Japan-China Play-off was held in Beijing on 8 May. Gu Li 7-dan (B) defeated Kato Masao 9-dan by resignation. This gave China its first victory in this series. First prize is ¥3,000,000.

Current international champions

4th Ing Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho (Korea)
1st Toyota & Denso Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
16th Fujitsu Cup: Yi Se-tol (Korea)
8th Samsung Cup: Cho Chikun (Japan)
4th Chunlan Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
8th LG Cup: Yi Ch'ang-ho
16th TV Asia Cup: Yu Bin (China)
2nd Cheongkwang Cup: Pak Chi-eun (Korea)
5th Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup: Korea
3rd CSK Cup: China

Most world championships won

19: Yi Ch'ang-ho
11: Cho Hun-hyeon
6: Takemiya Masaki, Yu Ch'ang-hyeok
4: Yoda Norimoto
3: Yi Se-tol, Yu Bin
2: Otake Hideo, Ma Xiaochun, O Rissei, Cho Chikun
1: Kobayashi Koichi, Rin Kaiho, Seo Pong-su, Zhou Heyang

(By country) Korea: 40; Japan: 18;
China: 6

Team championships (Jinro, Nong Shim, Igo Asia/CSK)

Korea: 11 Japan: 1 China: 1

News from Japan

Hane Naoki wins 28th Kisei title

Yamashita Keigo, Cho U and Hane Naoki have long been established as the top three players of the younger generation. Last year Yamashita and Cho made the big breakthrough of winning a top-three title. This year it was Hane's turn, though his success came at the expense of Yamashita.

There was a preliminary skirmish between these two in the Tengen title match at the end of last year. Up until that point, Yamashita had held

a dominating lead over Hane, but for the first time the latter prevailed in a title match, defending the Tengen 3–2. He still trailed Yamashita 5–10 in all encounters, but the psychological balance had shifted.

Hane retained his momentum when the Kisei title match started and rushed to a 3–0 lead. Yamashita seemed to be in terrible form, at least by his standards — the third Kisei game was his eighth loss in a row.

That was when things became interesting. Yamashita recovered form and reeled off three wins in a row to tie the score. At this point, his chances of defending his title looked good. Winning four straight after losing the opening three games of a series used to be dubbed 'a miraculous upset', but it has happened five times; actually, no player who had won three straight, then lost three straight, had ever turned the tide to win the final game.

There's a first time for everything. Hane played in masterly fashion in the seventh game and scored a convincing win. For a year, he will reign as Japan's number one and, if money is a consideration, there's a ¥42,000,000 prize as well — at nearly \$390,000, that rivals the Ing Cup prize.

The results:

Game 1 (15, 16 Jan.). Hane (B) by resig.
 Game 2 (28, 29 Jan.). Hane (W) by resig.
 Game 3 (4, 5 Feb.). Hane (B) by 3½.
 Game 4 (18, 19 Feb.). Yamashita (B) by ½.
 Game 5 (25, 26 Feb.). Yamashita (W) by resig.
 Game 6 (10, 11 March). Yamashita (B) by resig.
 Game 7 (17, 18 March). Hane (B) by resig.

29th Kisei leagues

The four new players in the Kisei leagues are Kobayashi Satoru, Ryu Shikun, Yuki Satoshi (Kansai Ki-in), and Miyazawa Goro.

Both Kobayashi and Ryu Shikun won their way back in immediately after dropping out. Yuki is making his league debut.

O Rissei defends Judan

O Rissei has held on to his place as the oldest titleholder — he is 45 — by rebuffing the challenge of Cho U Honinbo 3–1 in the 42nd Judan title match. He has thus held out against the wave of rejuvenation that is sweeping the go world. In this series, O proved himself more than a match for the youthful Honinbo; his best win was in the fourth game, in which he played bold and imagi-

native centre-oriented moves that looked more like O Meien's style than his usual territorial game.

This is the first time in a career that has garnered 22 titles that O Rissei has won the same title four terms in a row; he is the second player after Kato to do so in the Judan title, which usually has a rapid turnover.

In the play-off between the winners of the winners' and losers' section, held on 5 February, Cho (B) defeated O Meien by resignation.

The results:

Game 1 (11 March). O (W) by 9½.
 Game 2 (26 March). Cho (W) by 1½.
 Game 3 (8 April). O (W) by resig.
 Game 4 (15 April). O (B) by resig.

Kobayashi wins NEC and NHK Cups

Kobayashi Koichi is steadily increasing his swag of titles, picking up two *haya-go* or quick-go titles this spring.

First of all, Kobayashi (B) defeated Mimura Tomoyasu 9-dan by 2½ points in the final of the 23rd NEC Cup, played on 6 March, winning this title for the third time and taking the ¥15,000,000 first prize.

In the final of the 51st NHK Cup, Kobayashi met his old rival Cho Chikun; this was the 126th official game between them, extending their Japanese record. Taking black, Kobayashi edged Cho by 3½ points, which evened the score between them at 63 wins each. The game was telecast on 21 March. The prize is a more modest ¥4,000,000, but it is worth more in fame than the NEC Cup, thanks to NHK's large television audience. This is Kobayashi's 59th title — he's creeping up on Sakata.

Top title winners

66: Cho Chikun	Otake Hideo: 48
64: Sakata Eio	Kato Masao: 47
59: Kobayashi Koichi	Rin Kaiho: 35
Yoda Norimoto: 33	

Yoda challenging for Honinbo title

Go writers sometimes comment about Yoda Norimoto Meijin that he quickly gets a full stomach. By this, they mean that he seems to be satisfied when he wins one title and doesn't seriously try to dominate the title scene Cho Chikun-style. If so, things may be changing, as Yoda has launched an attempt to pick up his third concurrent title.

59th Honinbo league (2 October 2003 to 1 April 2004)

Title-holder: Cho U

Rank	Player/opponent	KM	OM	YK	KK	YN	OR	CS	MT	Score
—	Kato Masao	—	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2 – 5
—	O Meien	1	—	0	0	0	1	0	0	2 – 5
—	Yamashita Keigo	1	1	—	0	0	0	0	1	3 – 4
—	Kobayashi Koichi	0	1	1	—	0	0	1	0	3 – 4
1	Yoda Norimoto	1	1	1	1	—	0	1	0	5 – 2
3	O Rissei	1	0	1	1	1	—	0	0	4 – 3
3	Cho Sonjin	1	1	1	0	0	1	—	0	4 – 3
2	Mimura Tomoyasu	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	—	5 – 2

Yoda defeated Mimura in the play-off (5 April)

One reason why go writers may have the above impression is that Yoda has done surprisingly badly in the Honinbo tournament, having won a seat in the Honinbo league only twice in the past. On his third appearance, however, his luck changed.

To review the course of the league, the best start was made by Kobayashi Koichi, who won his first three games, leading to speculation we might see a match-up between father-in-law and son-in-law. However, he suffered painful losses in the fourth and fifth rounds, at which point Mimura Tomoyasu took the sole lead. However, the latter faltered right at the end, losing to Yamashita Keigo in the final round on 1 April. Kobayashi also slipped up at the end, and, so far from challenging, he lost his place.

In the last round, Yoda Norimoto surfaced for the first time. He had lost two of his first three games, casting retention of his place into doubt, but he held fast after that and ended in a tie for first with Mimura, on 5–2. He then won the play-off held on 5 April (taking black, he won by 2½ points). Mimura's poor finish meant that he threw away the best opportunity of his career so far; there's no guarantee he will ever get another chance like this.

There was an unusual phenomenon in this league: the top four players all lost their places. Of the three tournaments with leagues, the Honinbo favours the status quo the least.

One worrying point for Yoda is that in the past he has done badly against Cho U, having won only one game in six encounters. When the title match started, the defending champion kept the upper hand, winning the first two games. Yoda is going to have to draw on all his reserves of strength to make a contest of it.

Results to date:

Game 1 (7, 8 May). Cho U (W) won by ½.

Game 2 (24, 25 May). Cho (B) by resig.

Yoda wins Shusai Prize

Yoda Norimoto has won his first Shusai Prize, which is awarded to the outstanding player of the previous year. Yoda's accomplishments in winning the Meijin title for the fourth year in a row, challenging successfully for the Gosei title and starring in the CSK Cup were the main reasons for the honour.

Kobayashi Izumi defends Women's Meijin

Kobayashi Izumi 6-dan continues to reign over Japanese women's go. By defending the 16th Women's Meijin title against a fellow disciple of her father, Inori Yoko 5-dan, she maintained her position as the only Japanese woman player ever to hold three titles concurrently. She rebuffed Inori's challenge with straight wins. Later in the same week, her father won the NEC Cup, so it was a good week for the Kobayashi family.

The results:

Game 1 (25 Feb.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Game 2 (3 March). Kobayashi (W) by resig.

Women's Title Winners

- 10: Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan, Kobayashi Reiko 7-dan
- 9: Aoki Kikuyo 8-dan, Kobayashi Izumi 6-dan
- 8: Ito Tomoe 7-dan
- 7: Honda Sachiko 6-dan, Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan, Chinen Kaori 3-dan
- 6: Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan
- 5: Yoshida Mika 8-dan

Kono Rin wins 1st JAL New Stars

The JAL New Stars, which replaces the New Stars (Shin'ei) tournament, could justifiably be called a lightning-go tournament: ten seconds per move, though there is an extra ten minutes' time

29th Meijin league (4 December 2003 to summer 2004)

Title-holder: Yoda Norimoto

Rank	Player/opponent	YK	RK	CU	OR	CC	OM	KS	IT	YK	Score
1	Yamashita Keigo	—			0	1	1	0		0	2 - 3
2	Rin Kaiho		—	0	0	1		1	1	0	3 - 3
3	Cho U		1	—	1		0	1	1	1	5 - 1
4	O Rissei	1	1	0	—		1	0			3 - 2
5	Cho Chikun	0	0			—	0		0	0	0 - 5
6	O Meien	0		1	0	1	—		0		2 - 3
7	Kobayashi Satoru	1	0	0	1			—	1	1	4 - 2
7	Imamura Toshiya		0	0		1	1	0	—		2 - 3
7	Yamada Kimio	1	1	0		1		0		—	3 - 2

be used in one-minute units. In the final, telecast on 21 and 28 March, Kono Rin 7-dan (B) defeated Tahara Yasufumi 6-dan by resignation and took home the ¥1,500,000 first prize.

Cho U leads Meijin league

Whatever the result of the Honinbo title match, we're likely to see a return match in the autumn, as Cho U Honinbo has taken the sole lead in the Meijin league. However, all the players with only two losses are still in the running.

Quadruple ko

A game between Yoda Norimoto Meijin and O Meien 9-dan in the first round of the 2nd JAL Super Haya-go tournament ended up as no-result because of a quadruple ko, the first time this has happened in a TV game. The game was replayed.

This was the first quadruple ko for four years and the 8th in the last 40 years.

Yamada to challenge for Gosei

The play-off to decide the challenger to Yoda Norimoto for the 29th Gosei title was held at the Nihon Ki-in on 28 May. Playing white, Yamada Kimio 8-dan defeated Cho U Honinbo by half a point and so will make his first appearance in a top-seven title match since losing the Oza title in 1998. This will be his first Gosei challenge. He will be encouraged by the fact that he has done well against Yoda in the past, having a 6-2 lead.

The match starts on 29 June.

Mannami wins Women's Kisei

The 20-year-old Mannami Kana 2-dan has won her first title, defeating Chinen Kaori 3-dan in the 7th Women's Kisei title match. This title is run along the same lines as the NHK Cup, with 30 seconds per move and 10 minutes' extra thinking time, and games are broadcast on the

Igo & Shogi Channel on cable TV. First prize is ¥3,500,000 (about \$32,000). Chinen had held this title for four years in a row.

The results:

Game 1 (22 Jan.). Mannami (W) by 3½.

Game 2 (30 Jan.). Chinen (W) by 4½.

Game 3 (6 Feb.). Mannami (B) by 12½.

*Mannami Kana***Youngest woman professional**

Xie Yimin of Taiwan has set a Japanese women's record by qualifying as professional shodan at the age of 14 years five months. This lowers the previous record, set by Tanimura Kuniko, by four months. Xie was hailed as a go prodigy in elementary school at home and her parents took her on countless study trips to Korea and Hong Kong. She came to Japan to study two years ago, with the assistance of Ko Mosei 8-dan.

Promotions

Under the new promotion system, the top prizewinners in each dan group are promoted a rank. At a meeting of the screening committee on 24 February, the following 11 players were awarded promotions (effective as of 1 April) based on their 2003 results:

To 7-dan: Cho Riyu

To 6-dan: Takei Takashi, Kobayashi Izumi

To 5-dan: Kawai Shoji, Yamamori Tadanao

To 4-dan: Yamada Shinji, Kato Yuki

To 3-dan: Mitani Tetsuya, Mannami Kana

To 2-dan: Oba Junya, Inoue Hatsue.

The last-named player probably welcomes the new system: Ms. Inoue spent 31 years as a 1-dan.

The following players have earned promotions in recent months based on their cumulative-win totals:

To 2-dan: Asano Yasuko (30 wins)

To 4-dan: Miyazaki Shimako, Kirimoto Kazuo (50 wins)

To 5-dan: Ikezaki Tokinori (70 wins)

Kato Masao Acting Chairman of Nihon Ki-in

On 20 April, Toshimitsu Matsuo, aged 80, resigned as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in on the grounds of ill health. Imanaka Akio, one of the Vice Chairmen, became Acting Chairman in his place, but he was also not in the best of health and had only recently come out of hospital, so he also resigned. As a result, the other Vice Chairman, Kato Masao 9-dan, became Acting Chairman. Kato is still very much an active player, so we hope that the added duties of his new post don't adversely affect his playing. This is a very busy year for the Nihon Ki-in, with a full program of events to celebrate its 80th anniversary.

Former Finance Minister becomes Chairman of Kansai Ki-in

The vacant post of Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kansai Ki-in was filled on 24 February with the appointment of former Finance Minister Shiokawa Masajuro, who retired from politics in October 2003.

Milestones

Rin Kaiho became the first member of the

Nihon Ki-in to play 2,000 official games. He marked the achievement with a win, beating Hane Naoki Kisei in the Chinese Taipei vs. Japan match in the CSK Cup on 23 March. Rin's record is 1247 wins, 750 losses, 1 jigo, 2 no result.

On 19 February, Ishida Yoshio 9-dan became the 10th player to score 900 wins. His record was 900 wins to 533 losses (62.8%).

Retirements

The following players retired as of 31 March:

Ishii Mamoru 9-dan, Saijo Masataka 8-dan, Kotsugi Kiyoshi 8-dan, Shirae Haruhiko 7-dan.

Death of Nakaoka Jiro

Nakaoka Jiro 7-dan died on 9 April. Born in Muroran City in Hokkaido on 29 May 1921, Nakaoka became 1-dan in 1942 and reached 7-dan in 1973. He served a number of terms as a Nihon Ki-in director, including as head of the Overseas Department.

News from Korea

Go Prizes for 2003

The awards ceremony for the 2003 Go Prizes was held at the Intercontinental Hotel in Seoul on 29 January. This year the ceremony was jazzed up into something more like movie awards.

The star of the evening was Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 6-dan (born 12 March 1985), who won three prizes: top winning percentage, most wins, and new star. The Lifetime Achievement Award went to Cho Nam-ch'eol 9-dan (born 30 November 1923), the founding father of Korean professional go. Yi Ch'ang-ho won the Outstanding Player and the Popularity prizes.

Cho wins Women's Myeongin

Cho Hye-yeon 4-dan has scored yet another victory over Rui Naiwei and has usurped her place as the top woman player — and she is still only 18 years old. After the success of her Women's Kuksu challenge (GW100, page 10), Cho has now taken the Women's Myeongin title from her, by the same 2-0 margin. First prize is 8 million won.

Game 1 (26 Dec.). Cho (B) by resig.

Game 2 (31 Jan.). Cho (W) by resig.

Ch'oe takes Kuksu and Kiseong titles from Yi Ch'ang-ho

The 19-year-old Ch'oe Ch'eol-han 6-dan is confirming the promise shown last year when he won his first title, the 8th Bacchus Cup: Chunweon (see GW100, page 10). In successive months this spring, he took two major titles from the king of Korean go, Yi Ch'ang-ho.

The 47th Kuksu Title

In the 47th Kuksu title, Yi made the better start, but the challenger recovered and wrapped up the match with wins in the fourth and fifth games. His win in the second game was actually his first ever against Yi. Interviewed after the match concluded, Yi commented: 'Ch'oe reads more deeply than me.' This victory earned Ch'oe promotion to 7-dan.

The first game was hosted by the city of Dali in Yunnan Province in China.

Although this is the oldest Korean title, Ch'oe is only the ninth player to win it. First prize is 20 million won.

The results:

- Game 1 (14 Jan.). Yi (B) by 1½.
- Game 2 (7 Feb.). Ch'oe (B) by resig.
- Game 3 (18 Feb.). Yi (B) by 9½.
- Game 4 (23 Feb.). Ch'oe (B) by resig.
- Game 5 (2 March). Ch'oe (B) by resig.

The 15th Kiseong Title

In this match, also, Yi made the better start, but the opening game was the only one he won.

First prize is 26 million won (about \$24,000).

The results:

- Game 1 (27 Feb.). Yi (B) by resig.
- Game 2 (5 March). Ch'oe (B) by resig.
- Game 3 (6 April). Ch'oe (W) by resig.
- Game 4 (16 April). Ch'oe (B) by 2½.

Incidentally, in what was in effect a best-of-ten between these two players, Ch'oe's win with white in Game 3 above broke a streak of seven successive wins by black.

Rui wins Maxim Cup

Rui Naiwei 9-dan defeated Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan 2-1 in the final of the 5th Maxim Cup 9-dan Successive Wins Strongest Player tournament. This is her second win in a title open to male and female players (though it's restricted to 9-dans). Last year she lost the final to her hus-

band Jiang Zhujiu. Needless to say, this is the first time ever the same title has been won by both husband and wife.

First prize is 15 million won.

The results:

- Game 1 (26 March). Yu (W) by 3½.
- Game 2 (27 March). Rui (W) by ½.
- Game 3 (28 March). Rui (B) by 4½.



Rui Naiwei

Richest Korean tournament founded

A new domestic Korean tournament, the Electronic Land Cup King of Kings, has been founded with a prize fund of 500 million won (over \$400,000), nearly double that of the previous top tournament, the LG Petroleum Cup.

A unique feature of this tournament is that participants are divided into blocks by age: Young Dragons Group (under 25), White Tigers Group (26 to 50), Phoenix Group (over 50). Eight players from each group will advance to the Main Tournament.

14th King of the New Stars

Teenagers are not completely monopolizing the titles. In the final of the 14th King of the New Stars title, the 24-year-old An Cho-yeong 8-dan defeated Yi Yeong-ku 3-dan, who is just 16, 2-1.

First prize is 20 million won and second is 4 million won.

- Game 1 (7 April). Yi (W) by resig.
- Game 2 (21 April). An (W) by resig.
- Game 3 (30 April). An (W) by resig.

News from China



*China's number one, Gu Li,
wins two fast-go tournaments.*

Gu Li's successes in haya-go tournaments

Following on his success in the Chinese version of the Agon Kiriya Cup, reported in our previous issue, Gu Li 7-dan, the number one player in the Chinese ratings, has continued to do well in haya-go (fast go) tournaments.

Gu Li 7-dan defeated Chang Hao 9-dan in the final of the 9th NEC Cup to win this title for the first time. The game was played in Hangzhou City on 28 February, and, taking black, Gu forced a resignation. First prize is 200,000 yuan.

Gu followed up that success by defeating Yu Bin 9-dan in the final of the 17th CCTV Cup, played on 2 May. Taking black, he forced a resignation, to win this title also for the first time. First prize is 80,000 yuan.



Qiu Jun

Qiu wins King of the New Stars

In the final of the 11th King of the New Stars title, Qiu Jun 6-dan defeated Wang Xi 4-dan 2-1. The first prize is 30,000 yuan.

Game 1 (5 March). Wang (W) by resig.

Game 2 (6 March). Qiu (W) by resig.

Game 3 (8 March). Qiu (W) by resig.



Zhou Heyang

Zhou wins Xinan King of Go title

This tournament was held in Chengdu City in Sichuan Province from 23 to 25 February, with 25 players competing. In the final, Zhou Heyang 9-dan (B) beat Gu Li 7-dan by 1½ points. Wang Xi 4-dan beat Wang Yao 5-dan in the play-off for third place. The top three places were monopolized by members of the Chongqing team.

4th Ricoh Cup

Chang Hao won this tournament for the second time. First prize is 80,000 yuan.

Semifinals (6 March)

Chang Hao 9-dan beat Hu Yaoyu 7-dan.

Liu Xing 6-dan beat Wang Yao 5-dan.

Final (14 March)

Chang (B) beat Liu by resignation.

An unusual time system was adopted in this term of the title. Each player has to make 30 moves in the first hour, then 20 moves every 15 minutes after that. However, any time left over can be added to the subsequent time segments. Unfamiliarity with the new system caused a large number of losses on time.

Gu wins China-Korea Invitational

On 19 and 20 March, a match whose name translates literally as the Sichuan Dragon Spring Peach Blossom Festival China-Korea Invitational was held in Chengdu City. Gu Li 7-dan defeated Weon Seong-chin 5-dan of Korea 2-0.

Gu Li defends Tianyuan title

Xie He 5-dan challenged for the 18th Tianyuan title, but was rebuffed 0-2 by Gu Li 7-dan. Gu forced a resignation, playing white, in the first game (29 March), then won by 3½ points in the second (31 March).

First prize is 50,000 yuan.

Chinese ratings

Below is the rating list as of 31 December 2003. The top three places are unchanged from the previous list (GW100, page 11), but the players have increased their points.

1. Gu Li 7-dan: 2758
2. Kong Jie 7-dan: 2727
3. Zhou Heyang 9-dan: 2713
4. Wang Lei 8-dan: 2670
5. Hu Yaoyu 7-dan: 2657
6. Yu Bin 9-dan: 2635
7. Peng Quan 5-dan: 2630
8. Chang Hao 9-dan: 2615
9. Ding Wei 8-dan: 2609
10. Shao Weigang 9-dan, Qiu Jun 6-dan: 2660

Death of Liu Jun

Liu Jun, one of China's top amateur players, died of heart disease in Shanghai on 16 March. Liu won the 18th and 19th World Amateur Go Championships (1996 and 1997) and also won the Champion of Champions Tournament, held to commemorate the first 20 years of the WAGC, in 1998. He also won a professional tournament, the Chinese King of the New Stars, in 1997, beating, among others, Chang Hao and Zhou Heyang. Actually, Liu has formerly been a professional but had had to quit for health reasons.

The 16th Women's Meijin Title Game Two

White: Kobayashi Izumi, Women's Meijin
Black: Inori Yoko 5-dan
 Komi: 6½; time: 4 hours each.
 Played on 3 March 2004.




Figure 1 (1-60)

Figure 1 (1-60)

The manoeuvre from 25 to 39 works well for Black. Kobayashi commented that she should have jumped to 59 instead of 24.

Black 41 and 43 give White too much aji to play with. Instead, Black should play 41 at A.

White 60 sets up a ladder (on 41) if Black blocks at B.




Figure 2 (61-96)

ko: 79, 82; 84: connects

Figure 2 (61-96)

Black 65 is an emergency measure, but White can't be killed. Black gets no compensation if White lives, so she has to resign after 96, as she has no ko threats.

Black resigns after White 96.

(Go Weekly, 15 March 2004)

The 8th Samsung Cup: Cho Chikun vs. Pak Yeong-hun

The 8th Samsung Cup was Cho Chikun's first international title for 12 years, but actually, as he was the first to admit, he owed his win to an upset late in the final game when his opponent, Pak Yeong-hun, had victory 90% sewn up. As described in the news report in GW100, Pak handled his setback with admirable grace for an 18-year-old; he surely has a bright future in international go.

The good news for go fans is that neither player was overawed by the occasion. They went all-out in the best-of-three final, with no compromises, so it was a very entertaining match. We present all the games below.

Game One

White: Pak Yeong-hun 4-dan (Korea)

Black: Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan)

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each.

Played in the International Hall, Yeungnam University, Kyeongsan City (near Taegu City), on 8 December 2003. *Commentary by Cho Chikun.*




Figure 1 (1-50)
29: connects

Figure 1 (1-50). Cho's bad start

This game turned into a very hectic fight, as Cho launched a series of desperate attacks after making a bad move. Pak met the attacks head-on, leading to four large ko fights.

The atari of Black 23 leads to a new variation.


Black 27 could also be at 28. Cho: 'I played this because of my momentum, but White 30 was a good move. I thought that capturing with 35 might make me thick...'

Cho usually goes for profit, so perhaps he was not completely happy at taking the outside like this.

Black 39. Wanting to exploit the aji of the corner black stones is natural, but the follow-up was bad. Cho scornfully called 41 the losing move. 'Imagine not seeing the straightforward answer of 44. This is a move White wants to play anyway [even if it doesn't capture corner stones]. Black just lost all the stones he played. His loss adds up to one move and one point.'

Instead of 41, Black should have played at A, forcing White B.

The situation worsens when White attaches at 46. Instead of 45, Black should have played the forcing sequence in *Dia. 1*, forgetting about his corner stones.



Dia. 1: forcing without regrets

The Samsung Cup

First prize is 200 million won and second is 50 million won. The final has fluctuated between a best-of-three and a best-of-five.

- 1 (1996). Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan) d. Yu Ch'ang-hyeok 9-dan (Korea) 2-1.
- 2 (1997). Yi Ch'ang-ho 9-dan (Korea) d. Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan (Japan) 3-0.
- 3 (1998). Yi d. Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China) 3-2.
- 4 (1999). Yi d. Cho Sonjin 9-dan (Japan) 3-0.
- 5 (2000). Yu Ch'ang-hyeok d. Yamada Kimio 8-dan (Japan) 3-1.
- 6 (2001). Cho Hun-hyeon 9-dan (Korea) d. Chang Hao 9-dan (China) 2-1.
- 7 (2002). Cho Hun-hyeon d. Wang Lei 8-dan (China) 2-0.
- 8 (2003). Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) d. Pak Yeong-hun 4-dan (Korea) 2-1.




Figure 2 (51-100)

ko: 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81; 95: ko (at 85)

Figure 2 (51-100). Troublesome kos

Black tries to start a fire at the top. Cho: 'This is desperation. And it's still before lunch.'

White plays the strongest counter with 54, so Black gets ko threats. After a couple of forcing moves in the corner, he hanes at 59.

Cho: 'This worked out better for Black than it should have. If White had simply used 76 to defend at 82 . . .' If Black connects the ko, White extends at 76 and can handle the fight. Crawling at Black A is 'nothing special'.

Black 77 makes trouble for White. He can't avoid the large ko after 82.

Black 97 and 99 are high-level moves: they make the coming ko threat bigger.




Figure 3 (101-150)

4: connects (below 2); ko (over 22): 25, 28, 31

Figure 3 (101-150). Black catches up.

Black 3. Black has profited from the ko fight. Cho: 'Now I think about it calmly, the game is a good contest.'

Putting pressure on White with the one-space jump of 9 feels good. When White plays a probe with 16 and 18, Black ignores him and defends with 19. Another ko follows with 20, but the result to 34 is inevitable. Black has really caught up quite a bit.




Figure 4 (151-200)

64: ko (left of 59); 67: ko (left of 62);
70: ko (left of 59)

Figure 4 (151-200). A bad move invites a worse one.

White 54 seems to indicate that Pak felt that the game was not favourable for him. This move makes yet another ko fight unavoidable.

Cho: 'I was astonished: I never dreamed he'd challenge me to a ko fight — after all, the ko threats that until a little while back had been so plentiful are now hard to find.'

Black 61. Black would prefer to be able to atari at 63 first, but then he doesn't have even one ko threat.


Up to 73, the top right corner is transformed into white territory and the bottom right side into black.

Black 75 is the move Cho regretted most in the game. White 74 is actually bad style (White 76-Black 77 is correct), but it induces Black to play the crude moves of 75 to 79. That's the funny sort of thing that can happen in a hard-fought contest.

Cho: 'I'm an idiot. I did think of playing 75 at 1 in *Dia. 2*. In the continuation there, Black

eliminates his bad aji in the top left corner and seems to have a definite lead.'

White plunged in at 84, taking Cho by surprise. He attacked strongly, but this group can't be killed. Connecting at 93 is too late: Black A won't be sente.



Dia. 2: good for Black




Figure 5 (201-240)

Figure 5 (201-240). A successful invasion

White rides roughshod over the territory where Black has been counting on making close to 30 points. That puts the issue beyond doubt.

Figure 6 (241-277). A decisive win for Pak

Cho: 'After ruining my position by, in effect, passing for a move, I managed to make the game a real contest. You can't expect to win when you let miss a chance to decide the game [as in *Dia. 2*].'

You have to admire Pak for his brilliant play in recapturing the lead.

White wins by 4½ points.

(Go Weekly, 22 December 2003)




Figure 6 (241-277)

*76: connects (right of 60);
77: connects (below 75)*

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Pak Yeong-hun

Played on 9 December 2003.

Commentary by Cho Chikun.




Figure 1 (1-20)

Figure 1 (1-20). An unorthodox start

Having made the unorthodox approach move of 4, White should answer the pincer of 5 by switching to A. Cho: 'At this early stage, with a

corner still open, proceeding with a joseki in the bottom right is bad for White.'





Figure 2 (21-60)



Dia. 1: not inviting for White

Figure 2 (21-60). *Cho full of admiration for his opponent*

White 24 is a move Cho took great pains over. If White plays 1 to 3 in *Dia. 1*, Black will pincer at 4. Later, pressing at 'a' will be an excellent move for Black, yet White will be reluctant to forestall it by attaching at 'b' [as that helps Black to build up his side position].

Black 25. One's first instinct would be to play at A, but apparently the moves to 29 show real fighting spirit.

Black 39 was exquisitely timed. Cho bestowed lavish praise on this move. 'Incredible! It wouldn't occur to me even if I thought a million years.' White has just played 34, then 36 and 38, in order to deny Black forcing moves on both sides, but his plan is foiled by 39. White 40 is forced, and, according to Cho, 'my territory has been cut back by about four points, and I can no longer aim at pushing through at B and cutting.'

Cho continued with 44, sticking to his original plan, but he commented: 'My position was shaky to start with, so after Black struck with 39

the game was clearly unfavourable for me.'

The psychology of a competitive activity is subtle. Black 47 to 51 seem to be too tight. If Pak were in his usual state of mind, surely he would slide to C, then jump out at D.

Pak's strategy with 53 to 57 again moved Cho to unstinting praise. 'This strategy was really impressive. It felt refreshing. Black 57 was a move with real atmosphere.'




Figure 3 (61-100)

Figure 3 (61-100). *White catches up . . .*

White is steadily occupying key points. White 64 is big — compare Black A. Even though Black jumps in at 65 at the top, attaching at 66 guarantees eye shape.

As compensation for letting White move into the right-side moyo, Black must secure quite a bit of territory on the left side and extending into the centre. However, when White moves slowly but relentlessly into the centre from the rear with 68, the stone at 65 becomes a heavy burden on Black. Cho: 'It's strange, but already the game is difficult for Black to win.'

Pak keeps on playing solidly, but . . .

Figure 4 (101-130) . . . and takes the lead.

By the time Cho had played 2, the Korean players following the game were beginning to look crestfallen. White 6 and 8 are the decisive points. The game is clearly good for White.

Figure 5 (131-168). *A surprising loss*

By the end, Black was barely ahead on the board. Black 63 to 67 were probably played to set the scene for resignation.

'Black played an exquisite tesuji, and the game was moving along well for him. I wonder where he went wrong,' said Cho in a puzzled tone.

The only explanation is that Pak played too tightly. 'I can't put my finger on any mistake that could have been the losing move,' concluded Cho. 'It was a strange game.'

Black resigns after White 168.

(Go Weekly, 22 December 2003)




Figure 4 (101-130)




Figure 5 (131-168)

Admittedly, this was a quiet game, compared to the first one, but it's worth savouring for Pak's bold centre strategy with 53 to 57 and his earlier tesuji with 39 — his opponent certainly appreciated these moves!

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Pak Yeong-hun

Played on 11 December 2003.

Commentary by Michael Redmond 9-dan. Report by Ise Eisuke.





Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30). Cho-style solid profit

Cho starts out by taking profit in two corners. This is not simply territory but the solid kind of territory that Cho likes. Live stones are strong stones.

The approach move of 14 invites the pincer at 15 — because after the joseki to 29 the invasion of 30 is just right. Instead of 25, Black could also have staked out a moyo with A. Locally, permitting White to play B (which Black must answer with 29) leaves Black dissatisfied, but Black's whole-board moyo is on the grand scale.

Note that when Black plays the more distant pincer in *Dia. 1* (the marked stone), then presses at 1, White resists with 4, which is not interesting for Black.



Dia. 1: not to Black's liking







Figure 2 (31-50)



Dia. 2: good for White



Dia. 3: a strong attack Dia. 4: better for Black

Figure 2 (31-50). Putting insufficient pressure on White

Black 31 feels good. If Black attacks in a conventional way with 1 in *Dia. 2*, White 2 is a good answer. If Black 3, this reverts to the 3-3-invasion joseki, which is slack for Black. If instead Black hanes at 4, White cuts at 3 and will be able to settle his group.

White 32. White is tempted to push up with 2 in *Dia. 3*, but Black will probably launch a strong attack with 3 and 5. After 9, White has no

base, so the top and right side look like turning into black territory.

To amateur eyes, letting Black play 33 and 35 looks bad for White, but, surprisingly, Redmond 9-dan pointed out that 35 was a little dubious. In the game, White secures perfect life up to 44, on top of which he is left with White A, so the black group's eye shape is not perfect. That in turn means that he can't resist a white cut at B strongly.

MR: 'I think that instead of 35 Black should have slid under White's position with 1 in *Dia. 4*. Even if 2 to 8 follow, Black still has the aji of stealing White's eyes with 'a'. The bottom right group secures definite life and becomes solid, and Black should be able to build a secure territory at the top.' This interpretation of Black's eye shape in the bottom right shows how rigorous professionals are.

Even though Black seems to expand the top with 35, his stones are high, so there are many gaps in his position. This is less than satisfactory.

White is completely alive on the side. Plunging in at 50 is the most effective way of exploiting the strength of a live group. Of course, at this stage Cho probably hadn't completely read out the fate of his invading stone. The flow of the game made 50 the natural move, but, as it turned out, this precipitated a difficult life-and-death struggle.





Figure 3 (51-67)

Figure 3 (51-67). Life-and-death complications

With 51 and 53, Black attacks White according to theory, sealing him in. He then launches a strong attack with 55. At this point, Cho used up a lot of his time allowance. We asked Redmond


9-dan the reason.

MR: 'If White makes the 58-59 exchange, his right-side group is not alive locally if Black makes a placement at A. This places constraints on White's play in the centre, so he doesn't want to play 58.'




*Dia. 5: dead
16: connects; 18: at 12*

Apparently, if White could comfortably live by playing 1 in *Dia. 5*, you could virtually say that he had the game won. Black continues by attacking with 2 and 4. If White plays 5 and 7, Black blocks off the centre solidly with 8, and White can't live. Even if he expands his eye space with 9, Black strikes at the vital point with 10; White captures a few stones, but Black makes a placement and kills him. Therefore, before playing 7 —



Dia. 6: White lives

Dia. 6. White will try to make an eye on the outside by attaching at 1. If Black answers facetly, White gets his eye (Black can't play 'a', as White 'b', threatening to cut, is sente), so his group lives. If the group at the top gets definite life, it's OK to force with White 'b'. Therefore, instead of 6 here —




Dia. 7: difficult

Dia. 7. Black will connect solidly at 1. When White secures an eye at the top with 2, Black plays 3, a strong move that stops White from getting an eye on top. White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' will follow, leading to complicated fighting. If Black plays 3 at 'd', White's side group is alive; White plays 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' and can save his top group — a capturing race with the top black group is among the possibilities.


These are the main points of Michael Redmond's research. Cho presumably analysed the same variations during the game.

MR: 'When White plays the sente move of 58, the continuation to 76 in the next figure is more or less inevitable.'

White 62 is natural. MR: 'If White jumps into the corner with 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black 2 and 4 set up a capturing race that Black wins. So White has no choice about 62.'




Dia. 8: Black wins



Dia. 9: White dies

'White 66. If White plays at 1 in *Dia. 9* to capture the two black stones, the wedge in at 2 is severe. White has to answer underneath with 3 and 5, so his group dies when Black hanes at 6.

'That means that White has no choice about 66, but Black mustn't answer facetly at 1 in *Dia. 10*, as White lives big with 2 and 4.'



Dia. 10: too good for White





Figure 4 (68-100)



Dia. 11: Black can't resist

Figure 4 (68-100). White extricates his group, but slips up later.

MR: 'The sequence played in the game, with Black stealing White's base and White moving out into the centre is a natural flow. Up to this point, I think the game is even.'

Note that Black 75 is a thick defensive move. Black won't be captured even if he omits this move, but he secures solid eye shape in the corner. This also sets up profit he can take later with Black A, White B, and the snapback of Black C — profit that is not to be sneezed at.

Forcing with White 82 the instant Black cuts at 81 shows Cho's inimitable flair. If Black resists by descending at 1 in *Dia. 11*, he collapses after the continuation to 10. If, however, White attaches at 82 after Black has strengthened himself in the centre, resisting with 1 and 3 as in the diagram may be feasible.


When White flees into the centre with 86, the question is to what degree Black can effectively attack this group. The game is tilting in White's favour.

Driving a wedge between the white groups

with 87 is natural. Since his path to the centre has been blocked, White secures life for his group on the side with 88.

Black expands the top with 89 and 91, but he can't expect to make a really large territory here.

The lack of perfect eye shape for his bottom right group means that Black can't play very aggressively. However, White's forcing move of 100 was a mistake very much regretted by Cho.



Dia. 12: White's missed opportunity

MR: 'Instead of 100, White should simply cut with 1 in *Dia. 12*. If Black does nothing here, the atari of White 'a' will be severe; if Black 'b', White connects with 'c', and Black has to defend at 'd'. Later, White has the cut at 6, and he should be able to play 'e' in sente, aiming at the eye shape of the whole black group.

'That means that linking up the black groups with 4 and 6 is about the best Black can do. In this shape, White can exchange 'f' for Black 'c', making a big difference in territory from the game; on top of that, White 'g' will also be sente, making a big difference in the centre. [When White missed this diagram], the game clearly became an easy one for Black.'

Figure 5 (101-124). Black takes the lead.

Black secures life for his group with 7. This feels good, because it steals White's eye shape at the same time, but —

MR: 'The right-side white group has become thin, so connecting at 1 in *Dia. 13* would also be a good strategy. If White omits 2, Black gets a ko with the sequence in *Dia. 14*, so he will play 2 in this diagram. Black can then force with 3 to 7. This would be severe.'






Figure 5 (101-124)
20: connects

White 8. Following *Dia. 15* would be usual. Because White makes the cut later with 10, Black dodges to 11, which shows good judgement. The continuation to 15 feels good for Black.



Dia. 13: better for Black

*Dia. 14: ko
2: elsewhere*



Dia. 15: proper timing





Figure 6 (125-167)

Figure 6 (125-167). The margin becomes wider.

By the end of Figure 5, Black was certainly doing better than White. When he bears down on White from the centre with 25 and 27 here, his lead becomes clearly manifested on the board.

MR: 'If White pressed at 1 in *Dia. 16* instead of 26, the bottom left white territory would also be quite big, so numerically the game would probably be close. However, if you were to lose like this, without doing anything, it's painful. In particular, it's not Cho's style.'

However, Black's getting a stone at 27 makes White thin in the corner, creating the aji of the contact play of 67, yet if White forestalls it by playing 66 at A, Black will solidify the centre with B and keep the lead. White 66 and Black 67 are more or less miai.



Dia. 16: losing small





Figure 7 (168-200)



Dia. 17: White lives

Figure 7 (168–200). *Temporary insanity*


White 68. If White resists with 1 in *Dia. 17*, Black lands a punch with 2; if White 3, Black lives with 4, but if White cuts at 'a' instead of 3, Black ataries at 3 and cuts White into two.

When Black lays waste to the bottom left corner, White finds that he hasn't made much territory at the bottom despite playing there first. Just about the only gain White has made in the last 50 moves has been saving his stones in the top right with 32 in the previous figure. When White fails to get territory in the bottom left, Black's centre territory makes its presence felt.


Black has a little bad aji in the centre. White forces lightly with 74 and 80, then takes aim at the bad aji at the bottom and on the left by cutting with 82. At this point, Black goes off the rails.

Black 83 can only be called a momentary aberration. White strikes at 84, and in a flash the black stones on the side are cut off. At one stroke, this causes an upset: White suddenly has the lead. MR: 'Instead of 83, Black should have defended at 1 in *Dia. 18*. Perhaps the thought flashed across his mind that White 2 might cut off his stones below. However, Black 3 is a good

answer; Black maintains his connection up to 11.' Instead of 6 —




Dia. 18: Black coasts to victory



Dia. 19: unavailing

Dia. 19. White 6 here doesn't work: he is captured by Black 7. Either White 'a' or 'b' is answered by atari at Black 'c', so White is helpless.

This is not a very difficult move to find, so Pak must have hallucinated. Perhaps he was too impatient to wrap up the game and didn't maintain his concentration.



Dia. 20: disaster
7: connects

Black 85 is essential in answer to White 84. Black also has no choice about 89. If instead he tries to rescue the side stones with 1 in *Dia. 20*, disaster strikes in the centre.

(*Monthly Go World*, February 2004)

Figure 8 (201–220). A graceful loser

Victory thus dropped unexpectedly into Cho's lap, though of course he carefully provided Pak with the opportunity to go wrong.

As mentioned in our news report in GW100 (page 3), the graceful manner in which Pak accepted his loss was exemplary. In any case, Cho had played well in the first part of this game, so his win was not completely undeserved.

Be that as it may, this was Japan's first international victory (apart from the CSK team tournament) since June 2000 and Cho's first for over 12 years. One hopes that it is a harbinger of a comeback on the local scene as well.

Black resigns after White 220.

(Translated by John Power)




Figure 8 (201–220)

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The 28th Meijin Title Match: Yoda vs. Yamashita

Games Two to Five

In GW100, we presented the first game from this title match. It was a convincing victory for Yoda, who seemed to establish an edge over the challenger. Below we present the remaining games.

Game Two: Yoda in dominant mode

White: Yoda Norimoto

Black: Yamashita Keigo

Played at the Hotel Niigata, Niigata City, on 24 & 25 September 2003.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-40)



Dia. 1: playable


Figure 1 (1-40). Inconsistent strategy

Black 15 is a turning point. Black could also follow Dia. 1. Kobayashi: 'White gets an excellent position, but the exchange of the marked stone for Black 3 is a minus. I believe that this would be playable for Black.' With 15, Yama-

shita goes for centre influence rather than profit. However, White defends solidly with 16, making Black's stones heavy.

Black 17 is also centre-oriented, but 19 goes for profit. Of course, it is taking away White's potential base, but Black doesn't have a severe attack after 20. Black 21 may be thick, but White captures a stone in a ladder with 22 to 28. There is now no way for Black to attack.

Kobayashi: 'Why did Yamashita suddenly change direction from thickness to profit? I think this is a disagreeable development for Black.'



Dia. 2: a consistent strategy


Instead of 19, Black 1 in Dia. 2 would be more natural. White takes the corner up to 14, but Black switches to 15 and all his stones are working together in a centre-oriented strategy. This would be more like the usual Yamashita style.

Black 29 was badly received. Takemiya Masaki (the game referee) exclaimed: 'Eh? This is unbelievable. The game is over. There's no tautness in the black stones.'

Capturing two white stones with 29 and 31 is quite unlike the grand, large-scale strategy usually associated with Yamashita. Instead of 29, Black should have followed Dia. 3. (If White 4 at 5, Black 4 is a good move.) Kobayashi theorized that Yamashita's play might have been affected by the failure of his thickness in the first game. He may have been trying to beat Yoda with his

own profit-oriented strategy. Whatever the reason, he had got off to a bad start.

White 34 is just right. Black 37 and 39 have no effect on White's solid position in the top right corner.



Dia. 3: playing on a larger scale




Figure 2 (41-70)


Figure 2 (41-70). *Yoda is full of confidence.*

White 42 and 44 are endgame moves. Kobayashi: 'Yoda is saying that it's not a contest, that he's confident in his position. This is a kind of fighting spirit.'

White reinforces his centre position just once, with 48, before switching to 50. If necessary, he can strengthen it further with White A-Black B-White C.

Black starts to attack at the bottom with 53 and 55, but 57 is slack, as it lets White settle himself with 58 and 60. Black is behind in territory, so he has to try to start a large-scale attack. Kobayashi advocated playing 1 in *Dia. 4*. If White 2, Black presses at 3, trying to dominate the centre. If the sequence to 11 followed, White would be left with two thin positions (the group at the bot-

tom and the one on the right side). Black would have some chances . . . Actually, White would probably work out a counter instead of 2 or 4 to avoid this result, but at least Black would have better prospects if he attacked.




Dia. 4: Black tries to attack

White 60 weakens the black group on the top right, which in turns means that the centre white group is strengthened.

White 66. The sealed move.

Black 69 is a tesuji. If Black simply connects at 1 in *Dia. 5*, White will cut off his centre stones.



Dia. 5: split into two







Figure 3 (71-100)
98: connects



Dia. 6: usual strategy?

Figure 3 (71-100). Yoda goes all out.


White 72. White is playing all out. The usual strategy would be to cap at 1 in *Dia. 6*, offering support to the weak centre group. The continuation to 6 is likely, whereupon White links up with 7. This would take all the pressure off White.

White 76 and 78 are also aggressive. The usual idea would be to play at A, strengthening the weak group.


White 86. Yoda commented that he should have compromised with White 89-Black 86-White 95. White can afford to give up a little territory on the side. However, Kobayashi commented that this was easy to say in retrospect. 'White has been playing all out, so he can't suddenly switch to a safety-first policy. I would play

White 86 at 92, treating the marked stone as light [= being ready to give it up]. Treating this stone lightly should help White in the centre.'

Black 91 is a sharp move: it's not easy for White's centre and side groups to link up now. If instead Black blocks at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White counters with 6 to 12 and is headed for an easy win. Black has to make a second eye with 'a'.




Dia. 7: good for White
9: connects



Dia. 8: safer

White 92. In a public commentary on the game at the Nihon Ki-in, Ishida Akira 9-dan commented that White 92 was Yoda's only slip of the game. He advocated avoiding the squeeze by following *Dia. 8*.



Dia. 9: risky

Black 95 is a tesuji. If White moves out with 1 in *Dia. 9*, Black may be able to contrive a double attack on the bottom and centre white groups.

White 96 is the only move, but White is forced to make a *dango* shape up to 98. This looks a little nasty for White.

Figure 4 (101-127). An oversight by Yoda?

White 4 doesn't look very strong, but Black can't counter with 1 in *Dia. 10*. Kobayashi: 'After forcing with 1 to 5, Black focusses solely on

killing the white group below. I thought it would be a good contest, but it doesn't go well for Black after 10 and 12.' If Black wants to capture White, he has to cut with 15 and 17, but White simply discards his tail with 16 to 22. Black has no continuation. This amount of profit is not enough for an upset.






Figure 4 (101-127)



Dia. 10: good for White




Dia. 11: definite eye shape

Therefore, Yamashita attacks on a large scale with 13, which keeps the two white groups separated.

White doesn't want to connect at A, as fleeing in this direction will hurt the bottom group.


White 14 to 18 are a probe, but they are not the best moves. Yoda seems to have overlooked 21, which suddenly weakens White's eye shape. Kobayashi: 'Instead of 14, White could have wedged in at 1 in *Dia. 11*. If Black 2, White plays 3; Black must defend against the double atari of 'a', so White captures with 'b' and secures ample eye shape: he is definitely alive.'

Yamashita attacks with precision. Black 25 is the only move. It's tempting to cut at 1 in *Dia. 12*, but the top right black group perishes after White 2 and 4. White 4 at 'a' would be a mistake: Black 4, White 'b', Black 'c'.



Dia. 12: bad for Black

Black switches to the bottom with 27, leaving A and B for ko threats. Yoda's next move took everyone by surprise, but first it's necessary to understand why Yamashita suspended his centre attack with 27.




Dia. 13: good for White
14: connects (below 8)

Dia. 13. If Black plays at 1, White doesn't have two eyes. As mentioned before, White doesn't want to connect at 'a'. Instead, he can exploit Black's bad aji at the top. If White cuts at 2, Black is forced to live with 3 and 5; the continuation is a one-way street. After White connects at 14, 'b' and 'c' are miai. Instead of 5 —

Dia. 14 (next page). Black 1 is a frightening

variation. The result is a trade, but Black gets sente. White would find it unpleasant if, after taking profit at the top, Black switched to the 3-3 invasion at C in the figure. Kobayashi: 'The strongest counter to 1 is to play at 'a'. White should be able to live after Black 'b' and White 'c'.'



Dia. 14: the trade favours Black





Figure 5 (128-160)

Figure 5 (128-160). A brilliant way to wrap up the game

White ignores Black's attack on his bottom group and secures his centre group with 28 and 30. This gives White insurance at A and B and also creates the threat of C. However, deserting the bottom group represents a very resolute decision. Victory is within sight, yet Yoda stakes the game on *shinogi* (rescuing a weak group).

Black 31, 33. This is the best that Black can come up with. He needs to capture the group on as large a scale as possible, but White counters with the light move of 34. If instead White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 15, Black has the severe cut of 4. This just gives Black a chance.



Dia. 15: what Black wants

White 34 makes miai of 35 and 36. In response to 37, White sacrifices on a small scale with 38. Black can't cut at D because of shortage of liberties: White E (or one line above). If Black connects at E, White plays F, and Black still can't cut.

The players in the pressroom looked at other variations, but they couldn't come up with any improvement on Black's play in this figure.

Yoda wraps up the game in dazzling fashion. The timing of 44 is clever. If Black blocks at G, White secures the corner with 50; even if Black plays H, White has gained. If, however, Black lays waste to the corner with 49, as in the game, White can play 58; if Black H, White continues with I, Black J, White K.




Figure 6 (161-176)

Figure 6 (161-176). A one-sided win

Yamashita resigns after White 76. If he blocks at 1 in Dia. 16, White saves these stones with 2 and 4; if Black uses 1 to reinforce to the right, White links up to the left.


Yamashita is known for his bold play and disdain for territory. The reason why he lost this game was his uncharacteristic territorial play.

However, in the words of Kobayashi, 'you can also say that Yoda prevented him from playing with his usual flair. You have to sit across the board from Yoda to appreciate his power. This was a convincing win for the Meijin.'

Ishida Akira concluded his public commentary by saying that in this game Yoda surpassed the challenger in all aspects: fighting spirit, judgement, and reading.

Black resigns after White 178.

(Adapted from the *Asahi Newspaper*)



Dia. 16: Black can't capture

Game Three: A clash of fighting spirit

White: Yamashita Keigo

Black: Yoda Norimoto

Played at the Bushi Sanso, Izumo, Shimane Prefecture on 1, 2 October 2004.

Commentary by Yuki Satoshi 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-24)


Figure 1 (1-24). Testing the commentator

White 18. White 20 and White A are also possible; yet another possibility is White B, which would be a large-scale move, more like Yamashita, but he chose the steady move of 18.


Black 21. Yuki: 'This puts me on the spot.' Asahi reporter: 'What do you mean?' Yuki: 'The

game looks like turning into a difficult fight in which the commentator's ability will be tested.'

When White played 20, he probably hoped for the sequence in *Dia. 1*. After the moves to 6, the marked stone is well positioned to attack Black. Instead of 5 —




Dia. 1: good for White



Dia. 2: good for Black

Dia. 2. Black 1 leads to a difficult variation. If White 2 etc., Black catches 10 in a ladder, thanks to the marked stone. After 13, White could capture two stones with 'a' through 'e', but Black skips out with 'f', weakening the five white stones below. This would be hopeless for White. Instead of cutting at 'a', therefore, White might play around 'g' — 'difficult' was the only comment Yuki had on this.



Dia. 3: peaceful

White 24 keeps the position difficult. More peaceful would be White 1 in *Dia. 3*. The result to 11 would be even. According to Yuki, White 24 is usually played when White has a stone at or near C.





Figure 2 (25-63)



Dia. 4: good for Black

Figure 2 (25-63). Yoda's sacrifice

Cutting at 25 is natural. In response, White 26 at 1 in *Dia. 4* also looks natural, but actually Black gets an excellent result up to 14.


Yoda was playing very slowly at this stage, which shows how difficult the corner fight was: 31 minutes on 21, 59 minutes on 31. Yuki commented that another candidate for the latter move was 1 in *Dia. 5*. Up to 29, both sides live, but White's thickness is superior. If Black plays 27 at 28, White 27 sets up a one-sided ko — that's why Black has to give way with 27.

It's Yamashita's turn to think with 34: 63 minutes. As 29 was the last move before lunch, the first four moves after lunch had taken nearly three hours.


Up to 43, Black lives but with a low position. Yoda was a little dissatisfied; during the game review, he muttered: 'Should I have attached?' He was referring to 33 at 1 in *Dia. 6*. In contrast to the game, Black takes the outside.

Black 45. Yoda unveils another of the sacri-


fices he is known for. Most players would save the stones at the top as in *Dia. 7*, according to Yuki.




Dia. 5: better for White



Dia. 6: alternative



Dia. 7: the conventional approach



Dia. 8: good for Black
ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20

White 46. Yuki: 'I would play at A without fail. Yamashita said later that he had wavered between A and 46, but I was relieved when Yoda agreed with me.'

Yoda regretted Black 59, as it lost ko threats.

He went ahead with the ko at 61 and 63 regardless, but inwardly he was quite upset with his play.

Black should have started the ko immediately with 59. That gives *Dia. 8*. Black gets two ko threats at 9 and 15, so White has to play a point-losing ko threat with 18. The result to 27 is better for Black.




Figure 3 (64-100)
68: ko


Figure 3 (64-100). *Yamashita goes all out.*

Yamashita ignored the ko threat of 69, so a swap followed. Yuki: 'Black slices through the right side, but the thickness White builds on the left is fantastic. I admire the challenger's resolute decision. The only thing is that Black should have played 67 at A, then, after White took the ko, connected at 70.'


White 80. The sealed move. The consensus among the pros in the pressroom was that White was a little ahead. Even Yuki, who had backed Black after the first day's play, had revised his opinion by the next morning. As he was leaving the playing room, Yoda had muttered: 'Just chaotic.' If we can take this comment at face value, he was dissatisfied with his position.

Actually, White 80 showed quite a positive attitude: Yamashita continued to go all out. Most people had expected White B, but Yamashita didn't want Black to build a large area at the top.

Black 81 was another move that took everyone by surprise; it shows a lot of fighting spirit. If instead Black attacks at 1 in *Dia. 9*, White links up with 2 to 8. This might look painful for White, but he is satisfied, as he has poked his head out with 2, and Black's group is thin.



Dia. 9: White is satisfied




Dia. 10: good for White

Black 93 is the proper move. Black 1 in *Dia. 10* is a makeshift move; Black cuts at 3, but White's cut at 4 is more effective. White next breaks through at the top with 6 on. This is hopeless for Black.

The centre thickness Black builds negates the influence of White's wall. When Yoda played 99, he thought that the game was good for him.

Before we leave this figure, we should answer the question of what happens if Black plays 95 at 96. The answer is very complicated: Yuki called it 'the most difficult problem of the game'.



Dia. 11: complications

Dia. 11. In the game review, Yoda commented: 'I wonder if I could have rammed into White with 1.' The players looked at a number of variations, but were unable to come to a definite conclusion. After further meticulous study, Yuki came up with the variation here. 'My conclusion is that it's a troublesome two-stage ko for Black.'

After forcing with 2, White hanes out at 4. Black links up on the edge up to 19, and White makes a diagonal connection at 20. White then tenaciously fights the ko after 27; even if White loses the ko, his group on top is alive, as 'a' and

'b' are miai. The only thing is that if White has to play 'b', Black's atari at 'c' affects the white group below, which is painful. Even so, this variation 'is feasible for White' (Yuki).





Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 12: Yoda misses his chance

Figure 4 (101-150). The losing move

White 2. The natural move is White 3, but Yamashita was afraid he couldn't win if he permitted Black A.


Black 9 is slack, according to Kobayashi Koi-chi, who was following the game in Tokyo. 'It's a mistake arising from optimism,' he said. Kobayashi and Yuki agreed that Black should have attacked at 1 in *Dia. 12*. If Black harassed White like this, he would get the territory at the bottom and take the lead.

Black does get a surprising amount of territory in the centre with 23, but White also plays a large move at 30 (worth 13 points plus).

In the subsequent fighting, the game remains close, but White seems to gain a bit of an edge.

Black 47 is the losing move: Black should simply hane at 1 in *Dia. 13*. White 2 is not a problem: Black counters with 3 to 13. White needs to add another move at the bottom; if he

switches to 14, Black secures a large area with 19. White might switch 2 to 7, but even so this is better for Black than the result in the game.



Dia. 13: Black's last chance





Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 5 (151-200). The game is decided.

When Black plays 47 in the previous figure, the continuation to 54 here is inevitable. The game is now good for White.

Black 55 is necessary. If omitted, White attacks as in *Dia. 14*.

Dia. 14. White plays inside at 1 and links up with 3 and 5. If Black uses 10 to block at 69 in the figure, which is a big move, White can get a seki with 11 and 13. On top of that, he has the threat of a ten-thousand-year ko with 'a' later. If Black uses 10 to defend the corner, the value of White 1 becomes seven points in sente, which is enormous. Instead of 12 —



Dia. 14

Dia. 15

10: at 69 in Figure 5;

15: connects

Dia. 15. If Black plays 12 and 14 here, his group dies.




Figure 6 (201-246)

Figure 6 (201-246). *New life for Yamashita's challenge*

Yamashita's fans had been disappointed by his poor showing in the opening games, but they must have been encouraged by his recovery in this game, in which he was more like his usual self. This win breathed fresh life into his challenge.

White wins by 2½ points.

(Adapted from the Asahi Newspaper)

Game Four: A moyo failure

White: Yoda Norimoto

Black: Yamashita Keigo

Played at the Atami Sekitei Inn in Atami City on 15 & 16 October 2003.

Commentary by O Meien 9-dan. Report by Matsuura Takahito. (References to the Asahi Newspaper commentary are given in brackets.)

The fourth game may have been the vital point of the series. With the Meijin leading 2-1, this game would either tie the series or put the challenger to a kadoban. I believe, at any rate, that Yamashita held the initiative into the middle game. I will examine this point in detail.




Figure 1 (1-12)

Figure 1 (1-12). *Yoda's innovation*

White doesn't feel like answering Black 7 at A: the sanrensei at B would be perfect for Black.

White 12 was well received by the players following the game in the pressroom as a typical Yoda-style innovation, but, looking at the result, I have my doubts about it. Because of this move, Yoda is put under pressure for a while. [Actually, the sequence to 11 appeared in a game between Yamashita and Cho Chikun in the previous year's Kisei league. Cho played 12 at A. Yoda commented later: 'I knew that game. What with this being a challenge match, I thought that playing the same way...']







Figure 2 (12-45) (12 repeated)



Dia. 1: good for Black


Figure 2 (12-45). Yoda's strategy fails.

Instead of 12, the straightforward move would be White 17. However, if the joseki in *Dia. 1* follows, then the location of the marked stone becomes ideal. Yoda disliked this prospect.

The aim of 12 is clear: White wants Black to answer at A, then he'll jump to 17. If Black continues with the joseki in *Dia. 1*, then after Black 10 White can immediately counterattack with 'a'. The initiative would switch to White. [In the diagram, Black can connect on the fifth line, letting White cut off a stone, as he can switch to the 3-3 point, but with the 12-A exchange in the figure in place, he doesn't have this option. *Trans.*]


Sparks fly when Black rams into White with 13, then attaches at 15. We can see that Yamashita has studied this variation — Black 15 is hardly the kind of move you play on the spur of the moment. Black blocks forcefully at 19, making White defend at 20, and is satisfied. The reason is not that he has exchanged outside (19) for inside (20), but that he has made White back up to add a move.

This is not the first time that Yoda has played 12. I myself have been on the receiving end, though instead of 15 I played at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Yoda responded with the territorial continuation to 8. Perhaps he expected to see the same variation in this game.



Dia. 2: Yoda vs. O Meien

Players knowledgeable about style would be tempted to consider 19 at 1 in *Dia. 3*. Black uses the two-stone sacrifice to force unrelentingly with 5 to 9. The corner is nothing special.



Dia. 3: good style but not a good result


The variation in *Dia. 3* feels good, but only up to 9. Black can't neglect to repair the defect in his shape with 11, so White gets sente to switch to 12. Black will not be happy.

What is the difference between *Dia. 3* and the game? This is the most important point for understanding this opening. Black 21 defends against the cut of White 24. The logic of that is the same as in *Dia. 3*. Why doesn't White use 22 to switch to 1 in *Dia. 4*?

Dia. 4. The descent of Black 2 is severe. You don't feel like adding a reinforcement when you've already defended with the marked stone, do you? Let's assume that White occupies the bottom with 3. Black can play 4 to 8, and both White's centre top position and his corner are thin. White can't launch any sort of strategy while Black is aiming at the sequence here. White has no choice about 22 in the game.

When Black switches to the pincer at 23, we can say that the contact play of 15 has succeeded.

Probably we won't see much more of the diagonal move of 12 in actual play.




Dia. 4: White is thin

White 24 shows that the Meijin feels at a loss. Jumping out to 1 in *Dia. 5* looks like the only move, but the situation doesn't permit White to play in such a leisurely fashion. If Black extends to 2, his group will be pretty well secure. That means that the centre top white group will be exposed to a one-sided attack. White 24 shows a defiant attitude: do what you will. Striking a blow at 25, Black immediately seizes the initiative.


The only reservation is that White is actually doing his best under pressure. You have to admire Yoda's 30. The theory was advanced that White could try 1 to 5 in *Dia. 6*, but I wouldn't want to even consider this. Even if White blocks at 'a', he's not completely alive. There is nothing but black stones to the right, so White should aim at settling his group quickly. In this diagram, White thrashes around to little effect.

One might find Black 31 a little lacking in forcefulness. [At 46 minutes, it was Yamashita's slowest move of the game.] How about countering White's contact play with the hane of 1 in *Dia. 7*? This is the most natural move, but White is ready with the counter of cutting at 2. If 3 and 5, capturing with 6 is good enough. White sloughs off his four stones to the left and is satisfied.


Actually, Yamashita's consciousness has already shifted to the bottom. He has ignored an approach move there. How can he take sente at the top? He's focussed on this one point. That's why he comes up with Black 35. He blocks at 39, knowing that this stone will be captured. Forcing up to 44 gives him the sente he wants so much.



Dia. 5: too leisurely




Dia. 6: bad strategy



Dia. 7: White is satisfied

Here, too, there were conflicting opinions among the players following the game. I support Yamashita, that is, the sequence played in the game. I see 45 as big.



Dia. 8: securing the corner may not be best

If, instead of 39, Black plays 1 in *Dia. 8*, the corner looks like becoming black territory, which is the opposite result to the game. The idea behind this diagram is: it's an important game, so take the territory that's on offer. However, things don't look so good for Black when White plays first at the bottom with B in the figure. 'White

has taken profit in the top left and at the top: Black has to catch up . . . — that's not the feeling one wants to play with.

Up to 45, Black has nothing that looks like secure territory. One can't help wondering how the players viewed the territorial balance.





Figure 3 (46-65)



Dia. 9

Dia. 10

Figure 3 (46-65). Yamashita's strategic failure

When you see White 48, the question above is answered. Why doesn't White jump to 49? It would be a superb point: he pokes his head out while keeping Black's thickness at the top in check.

The Meijin still feels he's in trouble. He can't win with ordinary moves. Let's settle my group quickly, like at the top, then plunge into Black's right-side moyo: this is how I would verbalize Yoda's strategy.


Black 51 is an imposing move, typical of Yamashita. An alternative strategy would be to drive a wedge into the left side with 1 in *Dia. 9*. If Black lives up to 9, he should be able to make a fight of it on territory. If White counters with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 10*, Black lives with 5 to 13. If Black's aim is to build a position in which he's unlikely to lose, this strategy is perhaps preferable to that in the game.

Of course, Yamashita is not such a wimp. He believes that he can make a contest of it with the right side, even if he cedes 52 to White. This judgement is correct, of course. Black forces with 57, and the game approaches its crucial point.


Black 61 was the sealed move. It's a solid move — if White A, Black B, and vice versa. However, while I don't call it the losing move, I consider it a mistake in judgement that can be labeled a factor in Black's loss.

After some painstaking manoeuvring, Black seized sente at the top. His efforts were rewarded, and the right side was in the process of turning into a large moyo. Why, in this state of affairs, was it necessary for Black to turn to the bottom?

Yoda said that he had expected 61 at 1 in *Dia. 11*. Black 'a' will be absolute sente against the corner, so Black takes substantial profit. However, in the future, White can aim at 2 and 4. Black could play 1 at 2, but in that case Black 'a' won't be absolute sente.



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Even with his solid play with 61 in the game, Black still has grounds for anxiety. If White attaches at 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black can't counter at 2 — White 3 will be sente, so White can descend at 5.


In short, even after adding a reinforcement, Black can't completely capture the two stones here. In that case, what should he have done? The answer is simple: tenuki.

I believe that Black 1 in *Dia. 13* is the vital point. If White comes in at 2, Black resolutely attacks at 3 — as if he were full of confidence that he can capture White. It would be an acceptable development if White lived small on the right side by using his sente moves. Black could then switch to 'a', and now it's the bottom area

that will swell up. Of course, this time he doesn't play 'b' or 'c'. In response to 1 —



Dia. 13: a grand strategy



Dia. 14: an even grander strategy

Dia. 14. If White plays at 2, Black expands the centre even further with 3. If 4 and 5 followed, anyone would want to hold Black — how does the reader feel?

Because Black has set up a position in the bottom right that is neither fish nor fowl, the reducing move of 62 becomes ideal. After Black responds once with 63, his position is already inferior in scale to *Dias. 13* and *14*. What's more, thanks to his having played first in the centre with 62, White 64 makes the top left black group thin. I get the strong impression that, with that one move of 61, Black has let the Meijin deal him a fatal thrust of the sword. Imagine this: Yamashita has faltered in the kind of position that is

his greatest forte. Perhaps this is a sign of Yoda's strength.





Figure 4 (66-101)

Figure 4 (66-101). *Yoda takes the lead.*

It's extremely painful to have to make sure of life by answering 76 with 77 and 81. White could omit 82, but Yoda has calculated that this is good enough to win.

Cutting with 83 and 85 may look big, but White also takes profit in the bottom left with 90 to 100, so he is simplifying the position to his advantage.



Dia. 15: Black can't give the komi

Black 101. If Black 1 to White 4 in *Dia. 15*, the game will be decided by the komi. Here, too, the marked black stone is crying. If only it were at 'a' — but thinking that is like locking the barn door after the horse has bolted.






Figure 5 (102-150)



Dia. 16: unreasonable for Black



Dia. 17: Black is captured

Figure 5 (102-150). The game is decided.

Black has no suitable way of preventing White from encroaching on the right side. If, instead of 5, he plays the two-step hane of 1 in *Dia. 16*, White can play 2 to 6. The continuation is a little long, but it's a one-way street. The crucial point is, once again, the top left black group. When White cuts with 12 to 16, Black can't omit 17. There's trouble ahead when White blocks with 18. After 24, White has, at worst, a *seki*. This is, of course, a win for White.

Dia. 17. Let's also look at Black 1 (instead of 5 in the figure). Yet again, the top left group is a burden on Black. White cuts with 2, then with 4 and 6 makes *miai* of capturing three black stones and connecting at 10. The instant White connects at 10, the top left black group is captured.

The game is decided when White lives on the right side. My impression is that the final margin is surprisingly small, but that is because Black also secured a reasonable territory in the top right. In short, it's the influence of *deiri* (the difference between the potential area White had and the area Black made).





Figure 6 (151-200).

ko (over 51): 54, 57, 60, 63;

ko (over 66): 69, 72, 75



Dia. 18: the move Yoda missed

Figure 6 (151-200). Yoda's endgame oversight

[White 64 is a mistake. Yoda commented that the moment he played it he realized that Black could play 67, a move which ended up costing him two points. Instead of 64, White has the clever move of 1 in *Dia. 18*. Because of the snap-back set up by 1, Black can't save his stones at 4 and 8.

This slip was not enough to cause an upset, however.]



After recovering from a bad start in this game, Yoda now had an iron grip on the match.




Figure 7 (201-232)
32: connects (right of 30)

Figure 7 (201-232)

White wins by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.
(Monthly Go World, December 2003)

Game Five: A masterly conclusion

White: Yamashita Keigo

Black: Yoda Norimoto

Played at the Tokiwa Hotel at Yumura Hot Spring, Kofu City, Yamanashi Prefecture on 22 & 23 October 2003. Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan (the game referee), with reference (in

brackets) to the Asahi Newspaper commentary by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-31). Yoda avoids early complications.

The first move to catch the eye is Black 15. The usual strategy would be to answer the pincer in the bottom left with 1 in *Dia. 1*. Yoda apparently didn't like the prospect of being dragged into immediate fighting with White 2, but Black could answer peacefully up to 9 and would have no grounds for dissatisfaction. Yoda was consciously trying to avoid the kind of confused fighting that is Yamashita's forte.





Figure 1 (1-31)




Dia. 1: reasonable for Black

The large points of 17 and 18 are miai. [Playing 17 at 18 would work well with the descent at 15, but on the other hand it would let White set up a moyo contest with White A.]

Black 25. I have my doubts about this move. This area is not very big, so letting oneself take gote here is dubious. I'd prefer to invade at 1 in *Dia. 2* (next page), which makes the marked stone look good. Yoda commented that he would have been dissatisfied if White had discarded his stones with 2 etc., but most people, myself in-

cluded, would be happy with the size of the territory Black takes.



Dia. 2: not to Yoda's liking




Figure 2 (32-64)


Figure 2 (32-64). Yamashita's bold strategy

White 32 invites Black 35. Playing somewhere around White A in the upper left would be more peaceful. In this position, White will win if he can link up his top left and top right positions in a straight line.

When White plays 36, the moves to 46 are a one-way street. At this point, White plays a strong move with 48. I was impressed. White is fighting resolutely and is maintaining that the centre black group is weak.

Black 49 is the only move. Chasing White from the centre with Black 56 would let him jump to B, thus completing the line, referred to above, linking up his groups.


White 50 and 52 look like the kind of moves an amateur would be scolded for playing [they make 49 a hane at the head of two stones], but they are both vital points. They take some of the pressure off the top left white group and set up White 54, which drives a wedge through the centre — White is doing well. Before playing 51, Black should have made the forcing exchange of Black C-White D.



*Dia. 3: a good alternative strategy
28: connects*

White spent no time on 60 [Yoda took 59 minutes for 59], but the hane at 1 in *Dia. 3* is also possible. The continuation is long but more or less a one-way street. After 29, the centre top white group is completely alive, and the top left white group is also settled, while White threatens a triple attack on the left-side, centre and bottom black groups. This would be an effective strategy.

Even so, the sequence in the game, leading to the sealed move of 64, is also very strong. The peep of 64 is very fierce.



Dia. 4: trouble for Black

Figure 3 (65-100). A wasted move and a life-and-death misreading

Black 67. Black would like to play 1 in *Dia. 4*, but White has a good counter at 2. Up to 10, a ko follows, but this would be awful for Black. If Black plays 3 at 7, White 3 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. If Black 9 at 'a', White cuts at 'b'. Black has

no choice but to back up with 67. However, White is left with the cut of A, on top of which the centre black group is not completely settled, so Yamashita's attack has succeeded brilliantly. At this point, it looked as if the series had become more interesting . . . [If instead of 67 Black hanes to the left of 66, White cuts at 68.]





Figure 3 (65-100)
86: captures two stones



Dia. 5: a superfluous move


White 78. With this one move White wipes out all the gains he has made so far in this figure. The aim of 78, of course, is to maintain a connection, but White ends up capturing two stones with 84 and 86, so the stone at 78 becomes superfluous.

Let's change the order of moves. If White captures with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, and the same moves to 7 follow as in the game, who would answer Black 8 with 9? In effect, that is what White has done in the game. He's virtually passed a move. Yet if White switches elsewhere with 84 and 86, he can't play with confidence while Black has the threat of B.


With this one move, White lost the lead, but if he had looked after his top left group properly, the game would still have been interesting. In short, if instead of 96 White had calmly blocked at 1 in Dia. 6, he would have lived unconditionally. Black has no choice but to spoil the centre eye with 2 and 4. However, White has a good move at 7. This is usually a dead shape, but —

Dia. 7. If Black makes the placement at 1, White gets an *oi-otoshi* up to 8. Instead of 1 —


Dia. 8. If Black plays 1, then captures with 3, White must add a move at 10. If he doesn't, the clever hane at 5 kills him through shortage of liberties.




Dia. 6: alive



Dia. 7: *oi-otoshi*



Dia. 8: dead
4: elsewhere




Dia. 9: best for 91

[In effect, Black 91 and 93 became the winning moves, but actually they would have been bad moves if White had answered them correctly. Some days after the game, Kataoka discovered the correct way to play. Black should make the placement at 1 in Dia. 9. White 2 to 6 offer the strongest resistance. If 7, White secures eye shape up to 12. However —

Dia. 10 (next page). When Black plays 1, White will lose if he gives up the two corner stones, so he has to connect at 2. That lets Black get a ko with 3. White's moves from 4 to 8 become ko threats (the ko captures have been omitted), on top of which he has scope to play at 10, so this is a one-move approach-move ko favourable for White. That means that even if Black had

played correctly, his attack would not have been decisive.

Kataoka: 'The best move for Black might be tenuki. He can leave the threat of the attack in the top left for later and play C or D at the bottom. All one can say is that the game would have been even.']



Dia. 10: ko





Figure 4 (101-150)
3: connects



Dia. 11: not enough
2: at 3 in the figure

Figure 4 (101-150). No ko threats

A ko fight starts, but, unfortunately for him, White doesn't have any really good ko threats. He cuts at 2, but of course this is not as big as the top left corner. He could also play the successive moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, but when Black continues with 4 and 6 this doesn't look big enough either.

Black 3 annihilates the corner. White 4 and 6 are hardly small when you consider the *deiri* (difference between White and Black taking the territory here), but Black has clearly profited. [According to the *Asahi* commentary, Black 3 is worth about 40 points and White 4 and 6 about 30.]

White 12 makes things worse. It's certainly true that this helps guard against the unpleasant threat of Black A, but that is a distant prospect; more to the point, White can't afford to play in such leisurely fashion. When Black switches to 13, his lead becomes definite. If White had played at B, Black would have still been ahead, but only by ten points on the board. There's a lot of difficult endgame left, and staging upsets is Yamashita's forte, so he might still have had something to look forward to.

Just after Yamashita secured the lead with his strong move of 64 in Figure 2, he made repeated blunders. The fact that he had the lead until the morning of the second day must make the result of this game all the more regrettable for him. By this point [13], the thread of his emotional commitment to this game had probably already snapped.




Figure 5 (151-185)

Figure 2 (151-185). The Meijin triumphant

White is playing just to see what happens. After 85, he can stop Black from coming in with the sente sequence from A to G, but, if he played the game out, he would lose by nearly 20 points on the board.

White resigns after Black 185.

(*Monthly Go World*, December 2003. Meijin report translated by John Power.)

The Korean Style: Korean Joseki Innovations (5)


by Oya Koichi 9-dan

We had a good response to the long article entitled *The Korean Style* in our previous issue, including requests for more from Oya Koichi, if available. As it happens, there were ten more instalments in the original series in *Kido*, so we plan to present these.

Note, however, that the patterns under discussion were evolving as Oya wrote about them. In this instalment, he begins by amplifying the treatment of a new move, White 10 in Ref. Fig. 1, that was covered in the instalments given in *GW87* and *88*.

Yet another new pattern

I went to Korea to compete in the Samsung Cup qualifying round that started on 29 July [1998]. I thought it would be a good opportunity to get new material for this series, but there was a surprise waiting for me. Already the pattern we treated before had evolved.




Ref. Fig. 1


Shao Weigang (W) vs. Yi Se-tol

Ref. Fig. 1. As we mentioned, the contact play of 10 requires a favourable ladder. After Black sets up the ladder up to 19, White is left with a defect in the corner, namely, the possibility of 1 to 7 in *Dia. 1* . . .

White plays the ladder block of 20. Perhaps we should call it an irregular approach move. It might appear to be lacking in forcefulness, in severity, but go is not such a narrow game.




Dia. 1: a burden on White



Dia. 2: clearly good for White

Dia. 2. Black 1 is what White wants. He escapes from the ladder with 2, after which 3 and 4 are likely. The problem is the above-mentioned corner aji. The extension at 4 makes a big difference to this aji.




Dia. 3: doesn't work


Dia. 3. The placement at 1 no longer works. Black has no continuation after White 2 and 4. The aji of escaping with Black 'a' is neatly erased by the marked white stone.

Escaping from the ladder with 2 in *Dia. 2* clearly gives White a good result.

Dia. 4. Black played 21 to stop the ladder stones from escaping. This looks natural, but actually it's dubious. White 22 and 24 are severe, and the result to 32 is clearly favourable for White. He can get a good result with White 10 in *Ref. Dia. 1* even when the ladder is unfavourable. It occurred to me that I owed my readers an apology.




Dia. 4: the game (21–32)



Dia. 5: a more rigorous strategy

Dia. 5. Countering the ladder block (the marked stone) with Black 1 is more rigorous. The result to 5 (which could also be at 'a') looks equal to me. If it is equal, then White 10 in *Ref. Dia. 1* is feasible even if there isn't a severe ladder block. The joseki has evolved.




Ref. Fig. 2

Ryu Shikun (W) vs. Kim Man-su

Ref. Dia. 2. This is an even more mystifying game. White is satisfied with the result in the top left corner. The reason is that the corner is virtually secure, thanks to White 8's being on the third line, as we discussed before. I mentioned that, in response to Black 'a', White 'b' is a good move [*GW88*, page 62, *Dia. 6*].

However, Kim unconcernedly played the sequence to 19. Could this be regarded as equal in Korea?


White 20 is a ladder breaker. White has taken profit in the top left and is now trying to take the lead at the bottom as well with his ladder breaker. Can Black permit this?




Dia. 1: the usual ladder breaker

Dia. 1. When attacking a small-knight enclosure with a ladder breaker, the usual move is 1 or 'a', but they don't work in this case (as the ladder passes further to the left), so one can approve of White 20.

Dia. 2. Even so, Black just calmly answered with 21 to 27 in the game. To me, the shape in the bottom right seems slack territorially and painful for Black, but perhaps the assessment in Korea is different. Strange, though, as Koreans are supposed to be so territorial.



Dia. 2: the continuation (21–30)




Dia. 3: spiral ladder

Dia. 3. If Black were dissatisfied with the result in the game, playing 27 immediately at 1 is the move that occurs to one. As you can see, escaping with 2 doesn't work: Black has a good time spinning him around in a spiral ladder.


In my judgement, it is only if Black plays first at 1 (omitting the 27–28 exchange in *Dia. 2*) that he gets a halfway decent result. What do you think?

Dia. 4. The reason why Black is in a hurry to make the extension to 1 in the previous diagram is that White 1 will usually be sente, because of the threat of the cut at 'a'.

Anyway, this is quite a strange game. What has happened to that highly competitive, extremely territorial conventional wisdom of the Koreans?




Dia. 4: ominous for Black



Ref. Fig. 3

Han Ch'eol-kyun (W) vs. Oya Koichi

It may be a little presumptuous, but I would like to give one of my own games. Because I was doing this series, I felt I had to play at 17 in Ref. Fig. 3. Instead —




Dia. 1: White lives

Dia. 1. I could have played at 1, but I disliked the fact that White occupies the 3–3 point and becomes clearly alive. I've become greedy.


The main point is White 20 in the figure. This leads to an interesting variation.

Dia. 2. Black 1 is not good enough, as White resists with 2 and 4. After 7, Black 3 should be the bamboo joint at 'a'. White's stones make good balance with the marked stone below: the ideal three-space extension from a two-stone wall.



Dia. 2: unsatisfactory Dia. 3: the only move

Dia. 3. Black 1 is the only move. If White expects a similar result to the previous diagram when he plays 2, he's being rash. The big difference is that Black is left with the thousand-ryo (coin) turning move of 'a'. This should also apply quite a lot of pressure to the white group in the top right; Black will probably welcome this fight.




Dia. 4: the game continuation (21-32)

Dia. 4. In the game, the sequence from 21 to 32 was played in a rush. How would the reader

evaluate this? Takemiya Sensei would probably say it's clearly good for White. Eh? Me? I think it's good for Black. After all, Oya likes territory.

In this instalment, we've looked at new patterns and shifts in judgement, focussing on actual games. As you can see, the patterns we've introduced in this series are evolving rapidly.

One more game to finish off with.



Ref. Fig. 4


Takahashi Hideo (W) vs. Weon Seong-chin

Ref. Fig. 4. This is homework for the reader. The moves to 10 are a common pattern. The next two moves, 11 and 13, are highly mysterious. The main variation previously had been Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. The pattern beginning with 2 was devised by Yoda Norimoto, and is an effective counter for White. White settles his group and, what's more, more or less in sente.

Research in Korea had also covered this variation. Korean players believed that this result was slack for Black.

What aim lies concealed in Black 11 and 13? This is your homework for the next issue. The answer is interesting!

(Kido, October 1998. Translated by John Power.)



Dia. 1

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The 28th Kisei Title Match: Yamashita vs. Hane

Game One

Black: Hane Naoki Tengen

White: Yamashita Keigo Kisei


Komi: 6½ points; time: 8 hours each

Played in Seattle, Washington, USA.

Black wins by resignation.


Commentary is by Rob van Zeijst, based mainly on a report of an interview with Fujisawa Shuko.

When asked if there were any particular points he would like to highlight before beginning his commentary, Shuko gave two diagrams.



Reference 1

White 1 seems slow. An alternative is given in the commentary.



Reference 2

Though it is certainly a big move, White 1 induces Black 2 and 4, forcing White to defend with 5 in gote. This caused White to fall behind, which ultimately proved to be decisive for the outcome of the game.

According to Shuko these two moves were the causes of White's defeat.





Figure 1 (1-19)


Figure 1 (1-19). The challenger plays black.

Upon performing the *nigiri*, the challenger drew the black stones.

Blocking on the outside with 12 is rare. The usual idea would be to follow *Dia. 1*.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 1. White exchanges 1 for 3, then switches to 3.

In the figure, Black has a good move at A (later seen in the game) if he plays first, whereas White blocks at B if he plays first (reverting to A in *Dia. 1*). In contrast, in *Dia. 1*, White can choose between A and B.

Incidentally, even if White doesn't use a move to defend at A in *Dia. 1*, he has little to fear. The worst thing that could happen would be if Black extended to 1 in *Dia. 2*. His aim would be to link up with 3 and 5. However, White is happy to block with 2 and 4, then close off the upper left corner with 6, turning most of the left side into territory.

Shuko notes that instead of following *Dia. 2*, Black might invade somewhere on the left side. (In general, A and B are good invasion points.) In the game, White 12 makes the left side smaller, so it is more difficult to invade at these points.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Incidentally, instead of White 12 in the game, White could have blocked at 1. Usually the moves through 7 would follow automatically. Black 8 next is the most natural move, even if it allows White to jump into the corner with 9. Although there are a number of variations, the moves through 14 are representative. This way of playing is a matter of style.

After White 14, Black 15 is natural. Black's aim is to make a double-wing formation by playing around C. However, White exchanges 16 for Black 17, then switches to 18, a move, according to Shuko, that has a good feel to it.

Dia. 4. Although not mentioned by Shuko, if Black is really in a hurry to take sente — e.g., in order

to play Black 7 — he could invade at 1. The moves through 6 are a joseki. This would allow Black to switch to 7. However, this result is considered to be good for White locally. For that reason, Black would play 5 at 6. If White 5 next, Black A, after which White has the choice of extending to B or starting a fight by pulling out his marked stone with C. With his solid style, Hane doesn't usually like to hurry things, but prefers to set up strong positions before fighting.



Dia. 4

In the game, Black invaded at 19 only after strengthening his position with 17. How will White answer this invasion?




Figure 2 (20–38)

Figure 2 (20–38). An unsettled problem

White 20 is an interesting move, typical of Yamashita. This move stresses center influence over taking care of his marked stone. The idea is that the marked stone won't die by omitting one


move, as it should be able to take care of itself or leave behind enough aji to live comfortably in the lower right corner.

Still, Black 21 seems to paralyze the marked stone. In addition, the exchange of Black 23 for White 24 before defending at 25 is a clever probe. This leaves behind a cut at A. If Black plays 23 later, White may answer at A. Black 23 and 25 intimidate White into defending with 26, making it possible for Black to switch to 27.


This brings us to the unsettled problem of White 26. Shuko said it struck him that this move was solid and reliable, but a little complacent.

Instead of 26, Shuko offered an alternative and backed it up by extensive reading.

Dia 5. Shuko asserted Hane would likely answer White 1 by blocking at 2. The sequence through 9 is more or less forced. Surely White doesn't need a reinforcement at A any more, in effect saving almost one move. As a follow-up, White can still look forward to attaching at B. On the other hand, Black gets both territory and stability (thickness), as well as sente.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6


Dia 6. Black can also answer by connecting at 2. However, this allows White to gouge out the corner with 3 before falling back and linking up with 5 through 9. Although this shape may look somewhat odd, it seems to be an accepted sequence. The problem comes next. While Black 10 and 12 are large in themselves, they also aim at *Dia. 7*.

Dia 7. If White plays elsewhere, Black 1 and 3 are severe. White 4 is the fighting move. But Black 5 puts White on the spot. White cannot capture the stone at 3 with A because the ladder does not work.

White's group is not fully alive unless White plays B—Black C—White D—Black E—White F—Black G—White H. But this leaves Black with the option of capturing the marked stones with I. This doesn't look appealing, so White has to find a better way of playing.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia 8. If White really puts his mind to it, he may then find White 5 instead after exchanging 1 and 3 for 2 and 4. The result up to 10 seems reasonable. In this case, White can answer the cut of Black A—White B—Black C, by extending to D without having to worry about his group on the right, as it is alive as it stands.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 9. Going back a little, after White 3, Black can forestall White's connection underneath with 4. Please note that a pro wouldn't consider A, as it lacks guts and has no effect on White's stones.


White has to extend to 5 to make life — the number of points trading hands in the corner is huge. White makes over 10 points vs. Black's profit of over 10 points in *Dia. 8*. The question then is, can Black recoup those nearly 25 points by attacking with 6? White 7 first is a good move.

Dia. 10. In response to White 1 and 3, Black must defend with 2 and 4. White is now strong enough to block with 5. This move is absolutely necessary, as it makes the marked black stones short of liberties — note this point for the continuation. The sequence from Black 6 to 12 is natural. However, White 13 is a strong move. If Black extends to A, White will play B—Black C—White D—Black E—White F—Black G—White H—Black I—White J, catching four pivotal black stones. In other words, the moment White attaches at B, Black must defend somewhere on the right side, e.g. at G. But then, White can easily escape with C. On top of that, Black's stones in the center don't look all that strong, so White's prospects are good.

Dia. 11. After White's peep at 1, if Black makes a solid connection with 2 instead of at A, White makes the exchange of 3 through 6, then switches to 7. This move is not only huge in terms of territory — Black can usually exchange B for C at an early stage, but White 7 forestalls that — it also takes away Black's eyes, thereby destabilizing the entire group of marked stones. Again, White has the upper hand.



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Professionals do not like to just run away with a weak group: they prefer to strengthen their stones by attacking while making territory at the same time. White 7 is such a move.

Dia. 12. Incidentally, if Black wants to play at 2, he should do so immediately after White 1, without first exchanging A for B (compare this with the comments on *Dia. 9*), as this leaves more potential in the position. However, after the sequence through White 9, Black has weaknesses and cannot effectively attack the marked white stones.

Reviewing all these possible variations, Shuko's conclusion was that *Dia. 5* gave the best result for both sides. That also means that White 26 in Figure 2 was the cause of White's falling behind.

Black 27 next is the largest point on the board — compare this with White playing at 28 first. The moves through 33 are a joseki.



Dia. 13

White 34 met with severe criticism from Shuko. This move leads to the sequence through 38, so White ends in gote. With 34 and 36, White is in effect defending an open-skirted area — it is still open on the right, as Black's next move makes clear. Instead of 34, Shuko gave the sequence through 11 in *Dia. 13*. The lower right is the most urgent area and the moves 1 through 9 seem fair for both sides. Black 10 is met with White 11. Later on, White still has the option of capturing the marked black stone with A. In addition, White can aim at reducing the upper right with B—Black C—White D—Black E—White F—Black G. Another possibility is attaching at F immediately. Shuko believes this is better than the game, even if White is still behind.

In the pressroom, the opinion of switching elsewhere instead of defending at 38 was voiced.

However, Shuko disagreed, as Black would immediately cut with B, urging White to respond at C. This exchange leaves a lot of bad aji in White's moyo and White will have a hard time turning the center into territory.

Figure 3 (39–76). An unexpected exchange

In Shuko's opinion, if Black played 39 at 40, he would be clearly ahead. However, taking a slow but steady approach with 39 might be more in line with Hane's style.




Figure 3 (39–76)
61: connects at 44


Finally, White is able to switch to the last unsettled area with 40. It looks as if the game is still far from being decided.

However, White 44 starts an expected exchange. Shuko believed that Yamashita probably felt dissatisfied with the sequence given in *Dia. 13* and wanted to shake up the game using his highly developed technique. Still, in spite of his brilliant technique, in the sequence through 61 White has been pushing the 'cart from behind' at the cost of letting Black build formidable strength in the center with 53, 55, and 57. These moves are sure to lower the prospects of White's center moyo. Shuko thinks that this sequence might have actually hastened White's defeat.

Black 63 is the perfect point for erasing White's moyo.

White 64 and Black 65 are both large, but, beyond its value in points, Black 65 will make its presence felt later, namely in the next figure. The exchange of White 66 for Black 67 is a loss in real

terms, but prepares for the attachment of White 70. Believing that White couldn't win without resorting to violence, Shuko asserted that White should attach with 1 in *Dia. 14*. However, after the sequence through 8, there is no way for White to capture the black stones.



Dia. 14

In the game, backed up by cool calculation, Black calmly responded to White 70 with 71 through 75. But what about White's gutsy move at 76?





Figure 4 (77–100)

Figure 4 (77–100). The decisive move.

When White plays the marked stone (White 76 in Figure 3), White's desperation is clear: to here and no farther! If he succeeds in turning his moyo into territory, White may even pull off a win. However, Hane has already read it all out — Black 77

and 79 are the decisive moves, since they force White 80 and 82, making 87 possible. White can't cut at 93, as *Dia. 15* illustrates.

Dia. 15. If White answers Black 1 by cutting with 2, Black 3 puts him on the spot. White 4 won't help him, as 5 makes miai of capturing two marked stones with A and four marked stones with B.




Dia. 15

So 88 is White's only choice. But this results in disaster when Black plays 91 through 95, and White has no time to connect his marked stone with 96.

Going back a little, was there no alternative for 86? What about White 1 in *Dia. 16*? Black would exchange 2 for White 3, then cut through with 4 and 6, protecting against a cut with 12. With the perfect clarity of hindsight, it now becomes clear what the effect is of the earlier exchange of the marked white and black stones — Black's stone has added value.

In the game, Black gets sente to lay waste to White's upper side with 97; Black is clearly ahead. After this move Shuko terminated his commentary by saying he didn't think there was a difference between the contestants in the depth or accuracy of their reading, but the beginning was just too bad for Yamashita and, to make up for that, he had to play moves that were unreasonable, creating too many problems. A mistake in judgement — White 26 — led to White's early disadvantage and from then on it was an uphill battle. After such a mistake, how much can you catch up? This is not to detract from Hane's ability though — for his first challenge in two-day games, he made a splendid debut.



Dia. 16

Figure 5 (101–142). *Black strengthens his grip.*

At the beginning of this Figure, Black is more than 10 points ahead on the board. Black 1 through 5 make territory while White is left defending his with 2 through 6. With 7 and 9, Black takes the last remaining large move. White 10 is large in itself, but White is threatening the black center group. Black calmly ignores the threat to play 15, worth more than 10 points. White 16 through 22 are an attempt to cut off Black's center group, but 23 through 27 ensure its safety. In the end, White has to come back with 34 and 36 while the gap is growing.




Figure 5 (101–142)




Figure 6 (143-179)

Figure 6 (143-179). Chop!

Black 43 induces 44 to 49 to prepare for the cut of 59 and 61. In the meantime, White is trying to lay waste to any territory Black might make here with 50, while hoping for some dividends to come through, as he prepares to attack with 62 to 66. Undisturbed, Black breaks through with 59 and 61 with their inherent threat. He capitalizes on this with 77 and 79 to make miai of cutting at A and B, killing White's center group.

Yamashita resigns.

Game Two

Black: Yamashita Keigo

White: Hane Naoki

Played at the Hotel New Otani Hakata in Fukuoka. Based on a public commentary by Tei Meiko 9-dan at Yaesu Go Center and on comments in the *Go Weekly* compiled and edited by Rob van Zeijst.

Figure 1 (1-36). An ordinary start

After White 8, Black played the large-avalanche joseki. White chose the variation of turning on the inside with 18. Immediately playing at 22 is also a joseki.

Dia. 1. After White 1, the moves through 13 are the standard joseki. Black has a large corner, and the marked black stone counters White's wall, greatly depreciating its value.






Figure 1 (1-36)



Dia. 1


The moves to 26 are inevitable. Next, Black 27, making White crawl once with 28, is a forcing move. It also prepares to make good shape with 31. White 32 is a flexible move, as it makes miai of attacking either one of Black's groups. Black naturally defends against the more severe threat with 33, so White attacks slowly with 34 and 36.

Dia. 2. After the moves in the game, Black 1 is the standard move in this kind of shape. It invites White to cut through with 2 and 4, leading to the sequence to 8. Next, Black can start a severe attack on the marked white stones by playing around A.



Dia. 2

Dia. 3. However, White won't be so complacent. He will counter with 2 and 4, then strike at 6 to foul up Black's shape. If Black A next, White B; if Black B, White A.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (37-64)


Figure 2 (37-64). Black's position falls apart.

Black 37 is therefore unavoidable, even if it invites White 38 and 40. Note that after 41, White does not force the exchange A for B — this may look like a free forcing move, but it gives Black more eye-shape while highlighting the defects in White's shape. White 42 is a splendid move, worthy of a new Kisei.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black 2 and 4 will only give White the chance to peep at 5. This will greatly help White in strengthening his center group.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. After exchanging 2 for White 3, and 4 for 5, Black could switch to 6. But it is unclear whether the 4-5 exchange will ever pay off.




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Black 3 also looks severe, but White 4 is a good move, urging Black to defend with 5. White next links up his weak stones with 6 and 8 while building influence. In addition, the combination White A-Black B-White C reinforces the notion that White 1 is really the vital point. Black also needs to remain aware of a white peep at D-Black E-White F.

That is the reason Black switches to 47 to resume the fuseki. Still, Black's center position is a little feeble, not exactly Yamashita's style.

After White 52, most professionals following the game would have preferred to be playing White. Black 53 only serves to reinforce the impression that Black is at a disadvantage.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7. After White 1, the general view was that Black should have played 2 to 6. It is unclear what happens after that, but White 7 is the vital point. However, Black would get unconditional life after he plays 8.

In the game, White 54 takes away Black's eye and, even though 59 and 61 are clever moves, White gets good shape and influence with the sequence to 64. After this, Black doesn't have a good move.

After showing *Dia. 7*, Tei Meiko, agreed that this was not Yamashita's style. Still, he believed that 53 was the culprit for Black's washout.




Figure 3 (65-100)

Figure 3 (65-100). White keeps up the attack.

White 66 is the vital point for attack and defense. Black is now left with a difficult choice. Instead of 67, if he just jumps to 69, White will start a leaning attack with A. Black 67 is therefore an emergency measure, and 68 is a natural counter. After 70, Black wants to cut at B, but, if White then plays at 74, Black has no answer, so he played 71. Of course, when he gets a ponnuki with 68 through 72 and ensures a connection for his stones with 76 while also aiming at invading at C, White is clearly ahead.

After having been on the defensive for such a long time, Yamashita finally recovers his composure a bit when he plays 87. This move aims at cutting White's position, and, if White half-heartedly defends at D, Black plans on following through with 109 (see Figure 4), the vital point of White's shape.

However, Hane shows that he is not scared easily — he boldly attacks Black's stones on the right, starting with the placement of 90, applying the motto 'the best defense is attack.' If both Black's and White's groups flee, White has no reason to be dissatisfied.




Figure 4 (101-150)


Figure 4 (101-150). Hane is playing brilliantly.

Black 5 is an interesting probe. If White wants to keep up the attack, 6 is good, but later Black can lay waste to White's territory here.

However, can't Black cut off White's group instead of fleeing again with 7?

Dia. 8. If Black wants to cut off White's stones in the center, the sequence from 1 to 7 is

the combination that will do it. Black must then make shape with 9, but now White 10 sets up a squeeze ending in a terrific tesuji, the cut at 16. The situation is hopeless for Black. Instead of 9, A looks good, as it captures the marked stone in a ladder, but White plays at 9, making miai of 14 and cutting at B. Again Black is in trouble.



Dia. 8
8: at 1; 15: at 10

Looking back, the attack starting with White 90 in Figure 3 all the way to 16 in this figure was Hane's one-man show.

Black 17 starts the endgame with White leading.

Black 35, hoping for White to connect, is opportunistic. White ignores it and plays 36 and 38, expanding his lead. Black should probably have played at 36 himself. Earlier in the game, Black could have atari'd at 35 and White would have had to oblige by connecting, but a peep at A would have been sente, too. Playing either move too early would lose opportunities. When Black finally played 35, it was too late.

Sensing that he is losing, Black scores a lot of points with 39 through 49. White 50 is a clever move —

Figure 5 (151–206). Hane scores his second win.

Black 51 immediately loses the game, since it allows White to capture the two marked stones with 52.

Dia. 9. Instead of 51 in the figure, Black 1 shows more fighting spirit. After 2, Black can counter with 3, 5 and 7 to connect at 9. In the game, A is sente, so Black 5 doesn't work. The marked stones are captured after 1, but they still have some

aji and White B–Black C–White D may prove troublesome.





Figure 5 (151–206)
81: connects




Dia. 9

In response to White 54, Black 55 may seem strange, but, in fact, Black is aiming at making the cuts at A and B miai. The severity of this move becomes clear when Black invades with 63 and 65.

Black 75 looks like a clever move highlighting White's cutting points and lack of eye-shape. Although it doesn't quite do the trick, White 76 is resourceful and Black falls for it with 77. This allows White to play 78 and 80 before connecting at 82. In addition, it gives White an eye if he plays at D. Black 77 is the final losing move. He should have at least tried *Dia. 10*. After White 1, Black 2 shows more persistence. White cleverly responds with 3

through 9 to prevent Black from cutting at A. But Black has more ko threats and can start a ko at B. This would have given him a fighting chance.



Dia. 10

In the game, White lives easily and wins the game.

Black resigns after 206.

Rob Van Zeijst is a four-time European go champion and European representative at the Fujitsu World Championship. He is the co-author of *Making Good Shape* and *1001 Opening Problems*

Mastering the Basics, Volume Three *Making Good Shape*

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
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Nine Endgame-Tesuji Problems


Skill at the endgame is more than just counting. A player also has to be able to find the tesuji that will give him the maximum gain. Here are nine problems that feature some endgame tesujis that frequently arise. Answers start on the next page. From the supplement to Monthly Go World, December 2003.

Problem 1. Black to play




The first move is obvious. The real test is finding the second move. How can Black take away the corner from White?

Problem 2. Black to play




The white stones are surrounding quite a bit of territory, but they have a defect. How can Black reduce White's territory?

Problem 3. Black to play




It is not possible to kill the white stones, but Black can reduce White's territory to zero. Where should he play?

Problem 4. Black to play




The two black stones on the left cannot be saved, but Black can use them to make a big profit in the corner. Where is Black's tesuji?

Problem 5. Black to play




Black's four surrounded stones will be captured, but their sacrifice will not be in vain. How should Black play?

Problem 6. Black to play




This position often arises in games. How can Black start a ko for the territory in the corner?

Problem 7. Black to play




Black can easily capture a stone, but he has a tesuji that will get him more. Where should Black play?

Problem 8. Black to play



Black is strong on the left and on the right. How can he use his strength to take away White's territory?


Problem 9. Black to play




If Black sacrifices a stone, he can fix the defect in his position and reduce White's territory. How should he play?

Nine Endgame-Tesuji Problems: Answers

Problem 1




Dia. 1. Correct




Dia. 2. Continuation

Dia. 1. Black must first atari with 1, forcing White to connect with 2. Black 3 is now the tesuji. Next —

Dia. 2. After White 4, Black squeezes with 5 and 7. White connects with 8 (at the marked stone), and Black secures the corner by connecting with 9.




Dia. 3. Failure




Dia. 4. Continuation 1

Dia. 3. Attaching with Black 3 is a mistake. Next —

Dia. 4. If Black tries to squeeze with 5 after 4, White will descend to 6. Black has to connect with 7 and start a capturing race. Next —



Dia. 5. Continuation 2




Dia. 6. Failure 2


Dia. 5. White ataries with 8 and the best black can do is to start a ko with 9 and 11. Clearly Black is better off with the result in *Dia. 2*.

Dia. 6. If Black simply hanes with 1, White will fix the defect in his position with 2. Again, the result in *Dia. 2* is better for Black.

Problem 2




Dia. 1. Correct




Dia. 2. Continuation

Dia. 1. The peep of Black 1 is the tesuji. Next —

Dia. 2. White has to connect with 2, so Black can link up to his stones on the left with 3 and 5. In the meantime, White must live with 4 and 6 in gote.




Dia. 3. Variation




Dia. 4. Failure 1

Dia. 3. If White blocks with 2, Black will link up to his stones above with 3. White has lost two stones.

Dia. 4. Attaching with Black 1 is not enough. White blocks with 2 and Black ends in gote when he draws back to 3.



Dia. 5. Failure 2




Dia. 6. Failure 3


Dia. 5. Black may end in sente after playing 1 and 3, but he has failed to reduce the white territory as he did in *Dia. 2*.

Dia. 6. Beginners might play a move like 1, but not only does this move end in gote, it eliminates the defect in White's position.

Problem 3




Dia. 1. Correct




Dia. 2. Continuation

Dia. 1. The placement of Black 1 is the vital point. Next —

Dia. 2. White must answer with 2 and Black plays 3 threatening to link up with his stones below. After the exchange of White 4 for Black 5, the result is a seki. White ends up with zero points of territory.




Dia. 3. Failure 1




Dia. 4. Reference

Dia. 3. Black must not throw in a stone with 3 because White will capture with 4. After the sequence to 7, Black has lost a point, namely, the stone that White has captured.

Dia. 4. Suppose that after the position in *Dia. 2* has been reached White ataries the two black stones in the corner with 1. Black can then atari with 2. White can't capture at 4 because his stones are short of liberties, so he has to capture the two stones in the corner with 3. Now Black also captures two stones. White gets four points and Black gets four points, so the calculation is still the same as in *Dia. 2*: White ends up with zero points.



Dia. 5. Failure 2




Dia. 6. Failure 3


Dia. 5. Black 1 is also a placement, but in this case it is not a good move. White now has a choice: he can play 4 and fight a ko or he can play at 'a' and settle for the seki in *Dia. 2*.

Dia. 6. Black 1 is an ordinary move. White blocks with 2, securing six points of territory.

Problem 4




Dia. 1. Correct




Dia. 2. Continuation 1

Dia. 1. Black should jump to 1. It may seem that Black plays this move with the aim of capturing the white stones, but that is not the case. Next —

Dia. 2. White must push in with 2, so Black can play 3, forcing White to capture two stones with 4. Finally, Black plays 5, securing a big profit at the top.




Dia. 3. Variation




Dia. 4. Continuation

Dia. 3. If White answers Black 1 with the hane of 2, Black will connect with 3. Next —

Dia. 4. White connects with 4 to prevent Black from capturing two stones. The sequence to Black 13 is inevitable, with the result that Black wins the capturing race by one move.



Dia. 5. Failure




Dia. 6. Failure

Dia. 5. The hane and connection of Black 1 and 3 are ordinary moves. The result to White 4 is unsatisfactory for Black.


Dia. 6. Instead of 3 in *Dia. 5*, Black might try to play 3 here. However, as the sequence to White 10 shows, this move results in a capturing race which Black loses by one move.

Problem 5




Dia. 1. Correct

Dia. 1. The diagonal move of Black 1 is the tesuji. After White descends to 2 —




Dia. 2. Continuation 1

Dia. 2. Black hanes with 3 and 5, but White can capture three stones with 4 and 6. Next —




Dia. 3. Continuation 2

Dia. 3. Black recaptures a stone with 7. White ataries with 8 and Black also ataries with 9. Black has succeeded in forcing White to fight a ko.




Dia. 4. Variation

Dia. 4. White tries to resist with 2, but White cannot readily approach the black stones from the right. He first has to play 4, but Black ataries the five white stones at the top with 5.



Dia. 5. Failure


Dia. 5. A descent such as Black 1 is often a tesuji, but in this position it fails. White attaches with 2. Next —




Dia. 6. Continuation

Dia. 6. Black tries to make some room with 3, but White ataries with 4 and 6 and the black stones are dead.

Problem 6




Dia. 1. Correct




Dia. 2. Continuation 1

Dia. 1. Black should atari with 1. White has no choice but to capture with 2. Next —

Dia. 2. Black peeps with 3, forcing White to connect with 4. If White answers Black 5 by connecting at 6, Black plays 7 and his stones in the corner have two eyes.




Dia. 3. Continuation 2




Dia. 4. Variation 1

Dia. 3. If White tries to kill the black stones with 8 and 10, the sequence to 15 shows how Black's stones can live.

Dia. 4. White is not very happy with the result in *Dia. 3*, so he will probably resist by answering Black 5 with 6. Black can then start a ko by capturing with 7; he is satisfied.



Dia. 5. Variation 2




Dia. 6. Failure


Dia. 5. Instead of 4 in *Dia. 4*, White might hane with 4. The sequence continues to 7 and the result is again a ko.

Dia. 6. There are some players who would meekly connect with 1. After White connects with 2, Black has lost his chance to invade White's corner.

Problem 7




Dia. 1. Correct




Dia. 2. Continuation 1

Dia. 1. Black should attach with 1. Next —

Dia. 2. If White resists with 2, Black plays 3. White has to go back and connect with 4, so Black catches a stone with 5.




Dia. 3. Variation



Dia. 4. Continuation


Dia. 3. White might also resist with 2, but this would be answered by Black 3. Next —

Dia. 4. White connects with 4 and a capturing race arises, but it is Black who ataries first with 9.




Dia. 3. Variation

Dia. 3. White could block from the left with 2, but Black would then cut with 3. After White 4 —




Dia. 5. Failure 1



Dia. 6. Failure 2

Dia. 5. Black 1 is the usual endgame move, but White can block at 2. Black has failed to get the most out of this position.


Dia. 6. Cutting with 1 just loses a stone outright and allows White to reinforce his position with 2.



Dia. 4. Continuation


Dia. 4. Black capture with 5, then, after White captures with 6, connects with 7 (at the marked stone). Black wins the capturing race.

Problem 8




Dia. 1. Correct Answer

Dia. 1. The peep of Black 1 is the vital point. Next —




Dia. 2. Continuation 1

Dia. 2. If White connects with 2, Black links up to his stones on the left with 3. Black has gouged out the base of White's stones.



Dia. 5. Failure 1


Dia. 5. Black 1 and 3 are one method of securing the corner, but, after Black draws back with 5, White can secure his stones with 6



Dia. 6. Failure 2


Dia. 6. The hane and connection of Black 1 and 3 are also inferior to the correct answer. After White draws back to 4, his stones are secure.

Problem 9




Dia. 1. Correct Answer

Dia. 1. The hane of Black 1 is the correct answer. This is the stone that Black will sacrifice. Black now makes a placement with 3.




Dia. 2. Continuation 1

Dia. 2. White has to connect with 4. Black now squeezes with 5 and 7, forcing White to capture with 6 and 8 and ending in sente.




Dia. 3. Failure

Dia. 3. In answer to White 2, the atari of Black 3 is a mistake. Next —




Dia. 4. Continuation

Dia. 4. After White 4, Black can squeeze with 5 and 7, but he loses the marked stone. Compared to *Dia. 2*, this is a two-point loss for Black.



Dia. 5. Failure 1

Dia. 5. Black 1 in *Dia. 1* is important. If Black omits this move, White will answer the peep of Black 1 with 2. Black can atari with 3, but he ends in gote when he connects with 5.



Dia. 6. Failure 2

Dia. 6. The hane of Black 1 is an inferior move. White makes an eye with 2 and Black no longer has any play against the white stones.

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